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INTRODUCTION
The voting rights of common stockholders have been gerrymandered
through the use of dual-class and multiclass governance structures, which
drive a wedge between the economic interests and voting entitlements of
shareholders. These corporate governance structures are designed to preserve
control for corporate insiders, including founders and family members.
Insiders can secure majority voting power in corporate affairs without
needing to retain a proportionate economic interest in the enterprise. The
corollary is that ordinary shareholders are not afforded a commensurate
amount of voting rights with their economic interest. Main Street investors
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have a diminished voice, and their ability to influence the decisionmaking of
firms is diluted. Although dual-class structures date back nearly a century,
this practice has been on the rise in American corporations—especially
following Google’s debut as a public company.
Google, Inc., a leading multinational technology firm now known as
Alphabet, Inc., established a dual-class ownership structure comprised of two
classes of common stock with different voting entitlements as part of its
initial public offering (IPO) in 2004.2 Class A common stock was issued to
the public and “entitled to one vote per share” whereas Class B common stock
was reserved for insiders including “founders, executive officers, directors . . .
and employees” and “entitled to ten votes per share.”3 As the company
explained in a preamble to its prospectus entitled “Letter from the Founders:
‘An Owner’s Manual’ for Google’s Shareholders,”
Google is not a conventional company. We do not intend to become one . . . .
[T]he standard [“one share, one vote”] structure of public ownership may
jeopardize [our] independence . . . . Therefore, we have designed a corporate
[dual-class] structure that will protect Google’s ability to innovate and retain
its most distinctive characteristics . . . . By investing in Google, you are
placing an unusual long-term bet on the team . . . . In the transition to public
ownership, we have set up a corporate structure that will make it harder for
outside parties to take over or influence Google.4

Thus, Google’s cofounders made it patently clear to potential investors
that its dual-class voting structure would make it difficult for external parties
to interfere with or exercise control over its insiders, who would retain
disproportionate voting power relative to their economic interest.
Just eight years following its IPO, Google announced a recapitalization
plan to install a novel tripartite class ownership structure.5 Google sought to
effectuate a two-for-one stock split by creating Class C nonvoting capital
stock and distributing one Class C share for each and every Class A and Class
B share outstanding.6 Google’s cofounders explained that they wished to
maintain their “founder-led approach” and to continue shielding Google
2 See Google Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) at iii (Apr. 29, 2004) (stipulating that Class A
and Class B shares of common stock “have identical economic rights and differ only as to voting rights”).
3 Id. at *21, 85 n.1. Common shares with relatively greater voting entitlements are colloquially
referred to as “high-vote stock.”
4 Id. at i, iii.
5 See Google Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) at 2 (Apr. 12, 2012) (disclosing that Google’s
“Board of Directors . . . unanimously approved a proposal . . . to amend [its] certificate of
incorporation to create a new class of capital stock, subject to stockholder approval”).
6 See Larry Page & Sergey Brin, 2011 Founder’s Letter, ALPHABET (Apr. 12, 2012), https://abc.xyz/
investor/founders-letters/2011 [https://perma.cc/8BL5-ZANJ] (announcing Google’s plan “to create a
new class of non-voting capital stock” which would be “distributed via a stock dividend”).
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“from outside pressures.”7 Although the voting power of insiders would remain
unchanged immediately following the recapitalization, this proposed transaction
would enable insiders to retain substantial voting control over time, as the
company would use Class C nonvoting shares for “routine equity-based employee
compensation” and “stock-based acquisitions” going forward.8 In other words,
this new tripartite class structure would preserve voting influence among insiders
“for decades to come.”9 Google shareholders promptly brought suit seeking to
enjoin the recapitalization effort by alleging breach of fiduciary duties and
arguing that the stock split was in reality a “thinly veiled attempt to entrench [the
founders by] preserv[ing] their voting power into perpetuity.”10 The parties
eventually reached a settlement pretrial, and the substantive issues in this matter
were never litigated.11 The recapitalization was finally consummated in 2014,
cementing Alphabet’s current tripartite class ownership structure.12
Dual-class and multiclass stock governance structures13 are employed to
secure control for insiders who would otherwise lack majority control of the
corporation based on their economic interest alone.14 These voting structures
are considered to be “the most extreme example of antitakeover protection”
since “these companies are virtually immune to a hostile takeover.”15 The use
of dual-class common stock regimes by Alphabet, Facebook,16 Snap,17

7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Verified

Class Action Complaint at 1-2, Brockton Ret. Bd. v. Page, No. 7469, 2012 WL
1497439 (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2012).
11 See Order and Final Judgment at 4, In re Google Inc. Class C S’holder Litig., No. 7469-CS,
2013 WL 5949928 (Del. Ch. Nov. 6, 2013) (“[T]his Court hereby fully and finally approves the
Settlement . . . .”); see also Google Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Oct. 30, 2013) (indicating that
“the Delaware Court of Chancery approved the settlement” of the civil litigation).
12 See, e.g., Google Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) at 8 (Apr. 24, 2014) (“In January 2014,
our board of directors approved a distribution of shares of the Class C capital stock as a dividend to
our holders of Class A and Class B common stock . . . .”)
13 Hereafter in this Comment, I use the phrase “dual-class” to encompass any dual-class and
multiclass stock arrangement that legally separates cash-flow rights from voting rights.
14 When a dual-class structure has ten-to-one voting entitlements reserved for high-vote stock,
it can be mathematically shown that a holder of such shares only requires less than ten percent
economic ownership to maintain majority voting control. Consider a firm with one million shares
of common stock, consisting of 90,910 high-vote shares and 909,090 low-vote shares. Each share has
the same cash flow rights, but high-vote stock is entitled to ten votes per share and low-vote stock
is entitled to one vote per share. The 90,910 high-vote shares are entitled to 909,100 votes whereas
the 909,090 low-vote shares are entitled to 909,090 votes. The high-vote shares, representing just
9.1% of the total number of shares, would secure voting control. Table 1 in the Appendix presents
these numbers and percentages.
15 Paul A. Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Extreme Governance: An Analysis of DualClass Firms in the United States, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1051, 1052 (2010).
16 See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
17 See infra note 26 and accompanying text.

2019]

The Corporate Practice of Gerrymandering

501

Spotify,18 Lyft,19 and other prominent technology firms has thrust the issue of
disproportionate voting structures into the spotlight and has raised pressing
questions about whether this is a desirable or problematic development.
Issues posed by nonvoting stock have been raised and explored for nearly a
century now.20 Interrelated topics of dual-class shares and nonvoting shares have
gained renewed interest in academic circles,21 law firm client memos,22 business
news outlets,23 and the investing community at large.24 A trade organization
See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Milton M. Bergerman, Voting Trusts and Non-Voting Stock, 37 YALE L.J. 445, 445
(1928) (“The practice of depriving stockholders of the right to participate in the management of
large corporations by means of . . . non-voting stock has become so widespread that the legal status
of these methods of disenfranchising shareholders assumes a new importance.”); A. A. Berle, Jr.,
Non-Voting Stock and “Bankers’ Control”, 39 HARV. L. REV. 673, 677 (1926) (“[T]he problem of
‘bankers’ control’ ordinarily arises only where there is a capital structure including a class of nonvoting stock actually . . . non-preferential in character, simultaneously with another class of stock
vested with voting power.”).
21 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class Stock,
103 VA. L. REV. 585, 589-90 (2017) (exploring the benefits and costs of dual-class structures from a
temporal perspective and finding that potential costs exceed potential advantages with the passage
of time following an IPO).
22 See, e.g., James Moloney, Sean Sullivan & Alon Sachar, Non-Voting Shares and Judicial
Scrutiny, 31 INSIGHTS, May 2017, at 10-13 (questioning what standard of review the Delaware courts
would apply to actions taken by Snap’s board of directors in light of its exclusive use of nonvoting
public shares); Steven M. Haas & Charles L. Brewer, Nonvoting Common Stock: A Legal Overview,
HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP (Nov. 2017), https://www.hunton.com/images/content/3/4/v2/34138/
nonvoting-common-stock.pdf [https://perma.cc/R6DU-BQ22] (intending to “provide an overview
of the legal issues associated with nonvoting common stock of Delaware corporations”).
23 See, e.g., Benjamin Robertson & Andrea Tan, Why Facebook to Snap Make Investors Feel Second-Class:
QuickTake, WASH. POST (Jan. 21, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/why-facebook-to-snapmake-investors-feel-second-class-quicktake/2018/01/21/21bba666-ff0f-11e7-86b9-8908743c79dd_story.html
(“Supporters say dual-class shares enable executives to focus on the long term and resist expectations by major
investors that each quarter’s earnings will be better than the previous one’s. . . . Detractors say dual-class shares
subvert the traditional system that’s designed to give equal treatment to all shareholders.”); Andrea Tan &
Benjamin Robertson, Why Investors Are Fretting over Dual-Class Shares, BLOOMBERG (July 10, 2017),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-10/why-investors-are-fretting-over-dual-class-sharesquicktake-q-a (discussing potential merits and contemporary issues with dual-class common stock structures).
24 See, e.g., J.P. MORGAN ASSET MANAGEMENT, GLOBAL PROXY VOTING PROCEDURES AND
GUIDELINES: NORTH AMERICA, EUROPE, MIDDLE EAST, AFRICA, CENTRAL AMERICA, SOUTH
AMERICA, AND ASIA 67 (2017), https://am.jpmorgan.com/blob-gim/1383433248923/83456/2017_
Global%20Procedures%20and%20Guidelines_FINAL.pdf?segment=AMERICAS_US_RET&locale=
en_US [https://perma.cc/NVW8-96TW] (“JPMAM believes in the fundamental principle of ‘one
share, one vote.’ . . . We are opposed to all mechanisms that skew voting rights . . . . Directors should
represent all shareholders equally and voting power should accrue in direct proportion to a shareholder’s
economic interest . . . .”); Patrick Danner, Biglari Holdings Shareholders Drop Effort to Stop Special Meeting,
SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.expressnews.com/business/local/article/
Biglari-Holings-shareholders-drop-effort-to-stop-12823122.php [https://perma.cc/KNB5-CRMT]
(“There’s pretty broad consensus among investors and people who study investments that multiple
share classes with different voting rights are not a positive for firm value or shareholder value . . . .”);
Letter from Anne Sheehan, Dir. of Corp. Governance, California State Teachers’ Retirement System,
18
19
20
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called the Council of Institutional Investors (CII), whose members collectively
manage over three trillion dollars in assets, has been actively lobbying to curtail
dual-class structures.25 More recently, the 2017 IPO for shares of the social media
company Snap Inc., which granted public investors no voting rights at all, caused
a major uproar in the investment community.26
Much theoretical legal and empirical economic scholarship supports
arguments on both sides of whether dual-class voting structures should be
allowed at all.27 The policy justifications for regulating dual-class structures
are rooted in the presence of collective action problems, agency cost issues,
and potential for abuse, such as the insider’s ability to secure perquisites at
the expense of other shareholders.28 Perhaps the best counterargument
against prohibiting dual-class stock structures altogether is that they ought to
be considered in the broader context: the declining number of public
companies in the United States and private enterprises choosing to remain
private longer to pursue growth and create value without fear of interference
from public markets, which can be more short-term oriented.29 Even though
dual-class structures can be good, nonvoting shareholders are underprotected.
to Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.calstrs.com/sites/main/
files/file-attachments/2017-08-17_hkex_listing_stds_new_board_main_board.pdf [https://perma.cc/
BH9T-V77H] (“CalSTRS believes equal voting and control rights proportional to economic interest
represents [sic] best governance practice. We believe a structure that sustains ‘one-share one-vote’
equally aligns shareowners’ economic interests.”).
25 COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, http://www.cii.org [https://perma.cc/H6R9JXNB] (last visited Oct. 19, 2018) (declaring the elimination of dual-class stock as one of the
organization’s top “priorities” and proclaiming that “[e]ach share of a public company’s common
stock should have one vote”).
26 See, e.g., Snap Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Feb. 2, 2017) (“This is an initial public
offering of shares of non-voting Class A common stock of Snap Inc.”); Trevor Hunnicutt, S&P 500
to Exclude Snap After Voting Rights Debate, REUTERS (July 31, 2017 9:44 PM), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-snap-s-p/sp-500-to-exclude-snap-after-voting-rights-debate-idUSKBN1AH2RV (“Snap’s
$3.4 billion March IPO was the third-largest ever for a U.S. tech company but some investors were
taken aback by the company’s unusual decision to offer new investors a class of common stock with
no voting rights.”); Steven Davidoff Solomon, Snap’s Plan Is Most Unfriendly to Outsiders, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/03/business/dealbook/snap-ipo-planevan-spiegel.html (“Snap Inc. is aiming to adopt the most shareholder-unfriendly governance in an
initial public offering, ever.”).
27 See infra notes 120–142 and accompanying text.
28 See generally ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling,
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305
(1976). For an extensive summary of the academic literature, see Renée Adams & Daniel Ferreira,
One Share–One Vote: The Empirical Evidence, 12 REV. FIN. 51, 52 (2008), which notes that the
dominant view in the literature is that “the ‘one share–one vote’ principle is desirable” and that
“concentrated control in the hands of a few leads to agency and entrenchment problems.”
29 See Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Dearth of I.P.O.s, but It’s Not the Fault of Red Tape, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/28/business/dealbook/fewer-ipos-regulation-stockmarket.html (documenting that “the total number of companies listed on the United States stock market
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In this Comment, I predominately focus on the extreme example of
nonvoting common stock and argue that this amounts to disenfranchisement
of public shareholders and necessitates modest reform.30 Part I considers the
traditional protections of ordinary shareholders and provides relevant
background information on dual-class structures. Part II explores the legal
rights and entitlements for nonvoting shares of common stock. Part III
studies and suggests potential solutions to the issues posed by nonvoting
stock. Current forms of regulation, whether supported by private ordering
arguments or external regulation arguments, do not accomplish enough in
addressing the problems posed by nonvoting stock. I advance a novel
multipronged framework for regulating nonvoting stock. First, federal
securities laws could enable nonvoting shares to cast nonbinding votes.
Second, state corporate laws ought to legally mandate that nonvoting
shareholders have the right to attend annual meetings in an observer role.
Third, state courts should impose a heightened standard of judicial review for
companies with dual-class structures to encourage the use of procedures that
empower shareholder votes. Fourth, nonvoting shares ought to have
additional voting rights in some specific contexts as a matter of positive law.
I. BACKGROUND
Part I explores the traditional protections of ordinary shareholders and
provides relevant background information on dual-class structures. Section
I.A explores voting rights, fiduciary duties, and statutory appraisal rights as
the three primary shareholder protections. Section I.B provides a historical
perspective on unequal voting arrangements. Section I.C studies the rising
popularity of dual-class structures. Section I.D examines the empirical
performance of dual-class structures vis-à-vis “one vote, one share”
arrangements based on financial and economic data. Section I.E provides the
normative arguments for and against such devices.

plummeted by nearly half” between 1996 and 2016); see also Adena Friedman, The Promise of Market
Reform: Reigniting America’s Economic Engine, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG.
(May 18, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/05/18/the-promise-of-market-reform-reignitingamericas-economic-engine [https://perma.cc/3M7F-VSNZ] (stating that “[Nasdaq] support[s] dual class
structures in appropriate situations” and that to maintain America’s status as a “magnet for
entrepreneurship and innovation . . . we must offer entrepreneurs multiple paths [including the choice
of employing dual-class stock structures] to participate in public markets”).
30 Perhaps unsurprisingly, “disenfranchise” in the corporate law context has entered the financial
lexicon. See ERIK BANKS, THE PALGRAVE MACMILLAN DICTIONARY OF FINANCE, INVESTMENT AND
BANKING 159 (2010) (defining “disenfranchise” as “[t]he process of removing voting rights from a class of
common stock so that investors in that class are only entitled to rent rights”).
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A. Three Traditional Stockholder Protection Devices
Decisionmaking authority in corporations is allocated between shareholders
and managers, including directors and executive officers. One key attribute of
all business corporations is the delegation of formal authority to a board of
directors to manage corporate affairs.31 As Delaware General Corporation Law
(DGCL) stipulates: “The business and affairs of every corporation . . . shall be
managed by or under the direction of a board of directors . . . .”32 In other
words, “corporate law typically vests principal authority over corporate affairs
in a board of directors or similar body that is periodically elected . . . by the
firm’s shareholders.”33 As Chancellor Bill Allen famously wrote in the 1980s
amidst the backdrop of a merger wave, “While corporate democracy is a
pertinent concept, a corporation is not a New England town meeting; directors,
not shareholders, have responsibilities to manage the business and affairs of the
corporation, subject however to a fiduciary obligation.”34
In our American model of corporate governance, shareholders have three
essential protections under state corporate law: voting rights, fiduciary
principles imported from agency law,35 and statutory appraisal remedies.

31 See John Armour, Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Mariana Pargendler, What Is
Corporate Law?, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL
APPROACH 1, 5 (3d ed. 2017) [hereinafter ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW]; see also id. (“[T]he five
core structural characteristics of the business corporation are: (1) legal personality, (2) limited liability,
(3) transferable shares, (4) centralized management under a board structure, and (5) shared ownership
by contributors of equity capital.”).
32 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2018).
33 Armour et al., supra note 31, at 12.
34 TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., Civ. A. No. 10298, 1989 WL 20290, at *8 n.14
(Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989).
35 One example of such principles goes as far back as 1928:

Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm’s
length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something
stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of
an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior . . . . Only thus has the
level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden by the
crowd. It will not consciously be lowered by any judgment of this court.
Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). More recently, the Delaware Chancery Court
has announced:
Fiduciaries are held by the common law to a high standard in fulfilling their
stewardship over the assets of others, a standard that . . . may not be the same as that
contemplated by ideal corporate governance . . . . Fiduciaries who act faithfully and
honestly on behalf of those whose interests they represent are indeed granted wide
latitude in their efforts to maximize shareholders’ investment.
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 697-98 (Del. Ch. 2005).
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1. Traditional Voting Rights of Voting Shares
“Generally, the right to vote is a right that is inherent in and incidental to
the ownership of corporate stock.”36 Not surprising then, “one share, one
vote” is the default rule in U.S. corporate law.37 Voting rights include two
distinct types of privileges, appointment rights and decision rights, which
enable shareholders to exert direct influence over managers.38 Voting
shareholders are generally entitled to vote on the election of directors;39 the
removal of directors;40 any proposed amendments to the certificate of
incorporation;41 the approval of major transactions, including mergers or
consolidations,42 substantial sales of assets,43 and general dissolution;44 as well
as other governance matters brought to stockholder meetings.45 The fact that
the board is elected by shareholders “help[s] assure that the board remains
responsive to the interests of the firm’s owners, who bear the costs and
36 5 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2025 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2017).
37 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(a) (2018) (“Unless otherwise provided in the
certificate of incorporation . . . each stockholder shall be entitled to 1 vote for each share of capital
stock held by such stockholder.”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.21(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016)
(“[U]nless the articles of incorporation provide otherwise, each outstanding share, regardless of
class, is entitled to one vote on each matter voted on at a shareholders’ meeting.”); see also
FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 36, § 2026 (“Generally, each outstanding share of corporate stock,
regardless of class, is entitled to one vote, unless the articles of incorporation provide otherwise.”).
38 See generally John Armour, Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Basic
Governance Structure: The Interests of Shareholders as a Class, in ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW, supra
note 31, at 49, 49-77. These two rights are particularly strong in countries where the presence of
controlling shareholders is common. Id. at 49.
39 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216(3) (2018) (stating that “[d]irectors shall be elected by a
plurality of the votes of the shares present in person or represented by proxy at the meeting and
entitled to vote on the election of directors” (emphasis added)).
40 See § 141(k) (stating that “[a]ny director or the entire board of directors may be removed,
with or without cause, by the holders of a majority of the shares then entitled to vote at an election of
directors” (emphasis added)).
41 See § 242(b)(2) (“The holders of the outstanding shares of a class shall be entitled to vote
as a class upon a proposed amendment . . . .”).
42 See § 251(c) (“[T]he agreement [of merger or consolidation] shall be considered and a vote
taken for its adoption or rejection. If a majority of the outstanding stock of the corporation entitled
to vote thereon shall be voted for the adoption of the agreement, that fact shall be certified on the
agreement . . . .” (emphasis added)).
43 See § 271(a) (“Every corporation may at any meeting of its board of directors . . . sell, lease
or exchange all or substantially all of its property and assets . . . when and as authorized by a
resolution adopted by the holders of a majority of the outstanding stock of the corporation entitled
to vote thereon . . . .” (emphasis added)).
44 See § 275(b) (“[A] vote shall be taken upon the proposed dissolution. If a majority of the
outstanding stock of the corporation entitled to vote thereon shall vote for the proposed dissolution,
a certification of dissolution shall be filed . . . .” (emphasis added)).
45 See § 216(2) (“In all matters other than the election of directors, the affirmative vote of the
majority of shares present in person or represented by proxy at the meeting and entitled to vote on
the subject matter shall be the act of the stockholders . . . .” (emphasis added)).
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benefits of the firm’s decisions.”46 Moreover, the right to remove directors
even more than the power to elect directors is considered an effective
mechanism for managing agency costs.47
Furthermore, voting rights of individual shareholders must also be
considered in the context of the diffusion of ownership or the lack thereof.
Described in quintessential Berle and Means fashion, “[t]he . . . governance
structure of the large American firm—distant shareholders, a board of
directors that has . . . deferred to the CEO, and powerful, centralized
management—is usually seen as a natural economic outcome arising from
specialization: shareholders would specialize in riskbearing but wanted
diversification, and firms needed specialized, professional management.”48
However, diffuse, fragmented ownership is not necessarily the norm for large,
modern American corporations.49 On the contrary, during the twenty-first
century, we now observe that ownership of publicly traded American
enterprises has been reconcentrated among a few large institutional
investment intermediaries, including pension funds and mutual funds.50
Mutual funds hold approximately one-fourth of the stock of publicly traded
companies in the U.S. and thus “have the power to be a significant force in
the governance of large U.S. corporations.”51 In fact, when considered
together, just three firms (BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street) represent
the single largest shareholder in forty percent of all listed American
corporations and eighty-eight percent of S&P 500 member firms.52
Furthermore, a comprehensive analysis of Institutional Shareholder Services
(ISS) data demonstrates that there is “remarkably high” internal agreement
in proxy voting by each of these “Big Three” firms and suggests each firm
implements a coordinated voting strategy across the various mutual funds

46 Armour et al., supra note 31, at 12.
47 Armour et al., supra note 38, at 55.
48 MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE at ix (1994).
49 See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the
Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (2001) (describing the “polarization of corporate

structure” between a “Dispersed Ownership System, characterized by strong securities markets, rigorous
disclosure standards, and high market transparency, in which the market for corporate control
constitutes the ultimate disciplinary mechanism” and a “Concentrated Ownership System, characterized
by controlling blockholders, weak securities markets, high private benefits of control, and low
disclosure and market transparency standards, with only a modest role played by the market for
corporate control, but with a possible substitutionary monitoring role played by large banks”).
50 See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and
the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 865 (2013) (“In 2011, for example, institutional
investors owned over 70% of the outstanding stock of the thousand largest U.S. public corporations.”).
51 Id. at 886.
52 Jan Fichtner, Eelke M. Heemskerk & Javier Garcia-Bernardo, Hidden Power of the Big Three? Passive
Index Funds, Re-Concentration of Corporate Ownership, and New Financial Risk, 19 BUS. & POL. 298, 313 (2017).
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that they manage.53 Also, these “Big Three” firms “side with management in
more than ninety percent of votes.”54
2. Fiduciary Duties and Judicial Standards of Review
Directors and officers owe fiduciary duties to the corporation and its
shareholders.55 Shareholders may seek to enjoin the actions of directors or
officers for behavior that is inimical to their duties. Shareholders may also
recover monetary damages for losses sustained for breaches of fiduciary
duties. The two traditional duties owed to shareholders are the duty of care
and the duty of loyalty.56
The duty of care generally requires directors to exercise reasonable care
when making business decisions.57 Duty of care violations are analyzed under
a “business judgment rule” standard of review.58 The business judgment rule
is a rebuttable legal presumption that directors discharged their duties of care

Id. at 316-17.
Id. at 316.
See, e.g., Klaassen v. Allegro Dev. Corp., No. 8626-VCL, 2013 WL 5967028, at *11 (Del. Ch.
Nov. 7, 2013) (emphasizing that “corporate directors do not owe fiduciary duties to individual
stockholders” but rather “to the entity and to the stockholders as a whole” and stressing that “[t]his is
true even if a single stockholder holds a controlling block”); see also Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum
Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (“[A] board of directors is not a passive instrumentality.”).
56 See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 745 n.400 (Del. Ch. 2005)
(“[O]utside the recognized fiduciary duties of care and loyalty (and perhaps good faith), there are no
other fiduciary duties. In certain circumstances, however, specific applications of the duties of care
and loyalty are called for, such as so-called ‘Revlon’ duties and the duty of candor or disclosure.”).
57 See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“Each member of the board of
directors, when discharging the duties of a director, shall act: (i) in good faith, and (ii) in a manner
the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation.”); PRINCIPLES OF
CORP. GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1994) (“A
director or officer has a duty to the corporation to perform the director’s or officer’s functions in good
faith, in a manner that he or she reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, and
with the care that an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably be expected to exercise in a like
position and under similar circumstances.”). But see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2018)
(allowing corporations to have exculpatory “provision[s] eliminating or limiting the personal liability
of a director to the corporation . . . for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty” in certain
contexts, namely duty of care violations that do not amount to duty of good faith violations).
58 See, e.g., Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 927 (Del. 2003) (“The
business judgment rule, as a standard of judicial review, is a common-law recognition of the statutory
authority to manage a corporation that is vested in the board of directors.”). Compare Melvin Aron
Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62
FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 439-449 (1993) (describing the duty of care as a standard of conduct and
the business judgment rule as the applicable standard of review), with Stephen M. Bainbridge, The
Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 90 (2004) (“[T]he business
judgment rule can [also] be seen as an abstention doctrine . . . [that] does not state a standard of
liability but rather establishes a presumption against judicial review of duty of care claims.”).
53
54
55
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and loyalty.59 This puts the burden on the challenging plaintiff to proffer
evidence for believing that there was a breach.60 In the absence of a showing,
courts will give deference to directorial decisionmaking.61 It is very difficult
for plaintiffs to make a showing and overcome the presumption.62
The duty of loyalty includes a cluster of duties and generally applies when
there is a conflict of interest of some sort.63 Duty of loyalty violations are evaluated
under the “entire fairness” standard of review.64 Entire fairness doctrine is the
most exacting level of judicial review since the corporation must prove that both
the process it undertook and price it achieved are fair to its stockholders.65 In
practice, this ends up being a very difficult burden for a board of directors or
59 See In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 124 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“The
business judgment rule is a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken
was in the best interests of the company.” (internal quotation mark omitted) (citing Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000))).
60 See id. (“The burden is on plaintiffs, the party challenging the directors’ decision, to rebut
this presumption.”).
61 See id. (“Thus, absent an allegation of interestedness or disloyalty to the corporation, the
business judgment rule prevents a judge or jury from second guessing director decisions if they were
the product of a rational process and the directors availed themselves of all material and reasonably
available information.”); see also Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 678 (Mich. 1919) (“The
management of the corporation and its affairs rests in the board of directors, and no court will
interfere or substitute its judgment so long as the proposed actions are not ultra vires or fraudulent.
They may be ill advised . . . but this is no ground for exercise of jurisdiction.”).
62 See Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 124 (“The standard of director liability under the business
judgment rule ‘is predicated upon concepts of gross negligence.’”).
63 See PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 5.02, 5.05
(AM. LAW INST. 1994) (codifying duties owed to shareholders in transactions involving self-dealing and
corporate opportunities); see also Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 (“[D]irectors can neither appear on both sides
of a transaction nor expect to derive any personal financial benefit from it in the sense of self-dealing, as
opposed to a benefit which devolves upon the corporation or all stockholders generally.”). But see Stone
ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (“[T]he fiduciary duty of loyalty
is not limited to cases involving a financial or other cognizable fiduciary conflict of interest. It also
encompasses cases where the fiduciary fails to act in good faith.”).
64 See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) (“The requirement of fairness is
unflinching in its demand that where one stands on both sides of a transaction, he has the burden of
establishing its entire fairness, sufficient to pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts.”).
65 The Delaware Supreme Court in Weinberger stated that

[t]he concept of fairness has two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair price. The former
embraces questions of when the transaction was timed, how it was initiated,
structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and how the approvals of the
directors and the stockholders were obtained. The latter aspect of fairness relates to
the economic and financial considerations of the proposed merger, including all
relevant factors: assets, market value, earnings, future prospects, and any other
elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent value of a company’s stock. However, the
test for fairness is not a bifurcated one as between fair dealing and price. All aspects
of the issue must be examined as a whole since the question is one of entire fairness.
Id. at 711 (citations omitted).
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controller to carry and induces parties to settle the litigation. Thus, it is evident
that the applicable standard of review is often outcome determinative.66
Fiduciaries also owe a duty of good faith,67 a duty of candor or disclosure
in certain transaction settings,68 and other intermediate duties in particular
takeover defense situations69 and sale of control contexts.70
However, Delaware courts have recently accepted arguments rooted in the
principle of shareholder ratification. Under Kahn v. M&F Worldwide, a case
referred to as MFW in the corporate lexicon, conditioning a transaction on
the fully informed approval of both an empowered and independent special

66 See, e.g., Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 90 (Del. 1992) (“The choice of the applicable ‘test’ to
judge director action often determines the outcome of the case.”).
67 As the Delaware Supreme Court discussed in In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation,

The good faith required of a corporate fiduciary includes not simply the duties of care
and loyalty, . . . but all actions required by a true faithfulness and devotion to the
interests of the corporation and its shareholders. A failure to act in good faith may be
shown, for instance, where the fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other than
that of advancing the best interests of the corporation, where the fiduciary acts with
the intent to violate applicable positive law, or where the fiduciary intentionally fails
to act in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious disregard for his
duties.
906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006); cf. Stone, 911 A.2d at 370 (“[T]he obligation to act in good faith does
not establish an independent fiduciary duty [equal to] the duties of care and loyalty. Only the latter
two duties, where violated, may directly result in liability, whereas a failure to act in good faith may
do so, but indirectly.”).
68 See Stroud v. Milliken Enterprises, Inc., 552 A.2d 476, 480 (Del. 1989) (“[W]hen a board of
directors is required or elects to seek shareholder action, it is under a duty to disclose fully and fairly
pertinent information within the board’s control.” (internal quotations omitted)); Lynch v. Vickers
Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278, 279 (Del. 1977) (requiring complete candor and full disclosure of “all
the facts and circumstances” in a situation involving a controlling shareholder); cf. Malpiede v.
Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1086 (Del. 2001) (“[T]he board’s fiduciary duty of disclosure . . . is not an
independent duties [sic] but the application in a specific context of the board’s fiduciary duties of
care, good faith, and loyalty.”). But see IRA Tr. FBO Bobbie Ahmed ex. rel. Class A Stockholders of
NRG Yield, Inc. v. Crane, No. CV 12742-CB, 2017 WL 6335912, at *14 (Del. Ch. Jan. 26, 2018)
(“Delaware law does not require management to discuss the panoply of possible alternatives to the
course of action it is proposing.” (internal quotations omitted)).
69 As explained by the Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,
Because of the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own
interests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders, there is an
enhanced duty which calls for judicial examination at the threshold before the
protections of the business judgment rule may be conferred . . . . We must bear in
mind the inherent danger in the purchase of shares with corporate funds to remove a
threat to corporate policy when a threat to control is involved. The directors are of
necessity confronted with a conflict of interest, and an objective decision is difficult.
493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985).
70 See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986)
(“The directors’ role changed from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with
getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the company.”).
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committee of directors and the informed vote of a majority of the unaffiliated
stockholders can shift the standard of review from entire fairness to business
judgment review in controlling shareholder transactions.71 Delaware has been
willing to extend its “MFW framework,” applicable to squeeze-out
transactions by controllers, to dismiss shareholder litigation and allow
directors to avoid the entire fairness standard of review in dual-class
recapitalization transactions.72 Under Corwin, the informed vote of
disinterested stockholders can shift the standard of review from enhanced
scrutiny to business judgment review in noncontrolling shareholder
transactions.73 Transactions riddled with conflict and defective process can be
cleansed by shareholders as long as there is adequate disclosure of “troubling”
director behavior.74 With Corwin, a shareholder voting mechanism can
otherwise cleanse a transaction where the board of directors would be deemed
to have breached their fiduciary duties had the shareholder action been
brought preclosing rather than postclosing.75 These recent doctrinal
developments substantially weaken fiduciary duties as a shareholder
protective device and purport to entrust the shareholder voting mechanism
as a counterbalance. However, the voting mechanism is deficient and
especially problematic for nonvoting shares.
3. Appraisal Rights
Finally, shareholders may have statutory appraisal rights under certain
circumstances. Appraisal rights are essentially put rights requiring the

71 See Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014) (holding that the business
judgment rule “should govern mergers between a controlling stockholder and its corporate
subsidiary, where the merger is conditioned ab initio upon both the approval of an independent,
adequately-empowered Special Committee that fulfills its duty of care; and the uncoerced, informed
vote of a majority of the minority stockholders”).
72 See NRG Yield, 2017 WL 6335912, at *9 (deciding reclassification transactions should be
analyzed as a conflicted controller transaction).
73 Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 305-06 (Del. 2015) (holding that the
business judgment rule, as opposed to intermediate standards of review under Unocal or Revlon, is
“invoked as the appropriate standard of review for a post-closing damages action when a merger that
is not subject to the entire fairness standard of review has been approved by a fully informed,
uncoerced majority of the disinterested stockholders” (emphasis added)).
74 Id. at 312.
75 As further stated in by the court in Corwin,

[T]his Court has never held that the stockholders had to be asked separately to “ratify”
the board’s actions for that effect to be given. Rather, it has been the ability of an
uncoerced group of informed stockholders to freely accept for themselves whether a
transaction was good for them that gave rise to the effect on the standard of review
applied in any post-closing challenge.
Id. at 312 n.24 (emphasis added).
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corporation to buy out a dissenting shareholder’s stock at a court-determined
price in specific merger transaction contexts.76
However, there has been increased uncertainty around appraisal rights due to
recent Delaware Court of Chancery decisions.77 Specifically, Delaware has been
willing to recognize efficient capital markets theory in the appraisal context for
companies with widely traded public stock and absent a controlling shareholder.78
B. History of Unequal Voting Structures
Unequal voting structures are not a recent phenomenon. Alexander
Hamilton is perhaps prescient for articulating the tension between utilizing
“one share, one vote” and “one shareholder, one vote” rules.79 Reporting to the
House of Representatives in 1790 on a National Bank, Hamilton argued that
[a] vote for each share renders a combination between a few principal
stockholders, to monopolize the power and benefits of the bank, too easy. An
equal vote to each stockholder, however great or small his interest in the
institution, allows not that degree of weight to large stockholders which it is
reasonable they should have, and which, perhaps, their security and that of
the bank require. A prudent mean is to be preferred.80

76 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit.8, § 262(a) (2018) (“Any stockholder . . . who has otherwise
complied with [the conditions set forth in this statute] . . . shall be entitled to an appraisal by the
Court of Chancery of the fair value of the stockholder’s shares of stock . . . .”).
77 See, e.g., Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., No. 11448-VCL, 2018
WL 922139, at *2, *54 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2018) (using unaffected thirty-day average market price for
estimating going concern value in an appraisal action, which represented a thirty percent discount
to the merger consideration). But see Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd,
No. 565, 2016, 2017 WL 6375829, at *5 (Del. Dec. 14, 2017) (finding that the trial court failed to
adequately consider the deal price in determining the fair value of corporation’s stock).
78 See Aruba, 2018 WL 922139 at *24 (noting the Delaware Supreme Court’s consideration of
the unaffected trading price in appraisals where a “company’s shares trade in a market having
attributes consistent with the assumptions underlying a traditional version of the semi-strong form
of the efficient capital markets hypothesis”); see also Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A
Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 414 (1970) (“[T]here is consistent evidence of
positive dependence in day-to-day price changes and returns on common stocks, and the dependence
is of a form that can be used as the basis of marginally profitable trading rules.”). But cf. Air Prods.
& Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 57 (Del. Ch. 2011) (rejecting efficient markets theory and
accepting “substantive coercion” as a valid threat for Unocal purposes in the takeover context).
Substantive coercion is defined as “the risk that shareholders will mistakenly accept an underpriced
offer because they disbelieve management’s representations of intrinsic value.” Id. at 96 (quoting
Ronald Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There
Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 BUS. LAW. 247, 258 (1989)).
79 SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL IN THE UNITED
STATES: CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION 1971–1980, 393 app. G, (W.S. Hein 1981).
80 ALEXANDER HAMILTON, REPORT ON A NATIONAL BANK (1790), reprinted in 3 THE
WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 388, 423. Hamilton may have been more
concerned with consumer protection than investor protection. See Henry Hansmann & Mariana
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It has been documented that “[p]rior to the beginning of the [twentieth]
century there existed but little restriction of the voting rights of
shareholders.”81 An early instance of publicly traded nonvoting common stock
in the United States concerned the International Silver Company, which
employed such an equity security between 1898 and 1902—long before Snap
Inc. offered nonvoting shares to the public.82 By May 1926, nine public
companies in the United States employed a dual-class common stock structure
with “two classes, alike . . . in all respects except that one class ha[d] voting
power and the other none.”83
One of the first known critics of the practice of corporations issuing nonvoting
common shares to the public was William Z. Ripley, a Harvard professor of
political economy.84 Ripley described the Wall Street practice of issuing nonvoting
Class A common stock to the public while simultaneously reserving Class B
common shares with voting rights for management as a “plague.”85 Years before
Berle and Means famously examined the problem of “separation of ownership and
control” in American corporations in the 1930s, Ripley reasoned that “the trouble
has to do with the growing dissociation of ownership of property from
responsibility for the manner in which it shall be put to use.”86
It is said that the 1934 creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) was in part due to Ripley’s muckraking.87 By the 1980s, the New York Stock
Pargendler, The Evolution of Shareholder Voting Rights: Separation of Ownership and Consumption, 123
YALE L.J. 948, 979 (2014) (“[Hamilton] seemed particularly concerned with mitigating profitmaximizing behavior by the Bank’s shareholders to the detriment of consumers, as well as with
preventing favoritism in lending decisions.”).
81 W.H.S. Stevens, Stockholders’ Voting Rights and the Centralization of Voting Control, 40 Q.J.
ECON. 353, 353 (1926).
82 Id. at 355.
83 Id. at 360-61. These companies included “three of the leading tobacco companies: American,
Liggett and Myers, and R. J. Reynolds.” Id. at 360.
84 See Berle, supra note 20 at 674 (“Forcibly called to the attention of the public by a recent
address of Professor Ripley, [non-voting shares] form one of the major problems which lie on the
border line between corporation law and financial practice.”); When Ripley Speaks, Wall Street Heeds:
From His Quiet Study This Harvard Professor Issues Sensational Indictments That Force Reforms, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 26, 1926, at 7 (documenting Ripley’s concern for “non-voting stocks which . . . make
still more secure the position of the professional financier as against the amateur speculator or
investor”); see also, Stephen Mihm, Non-Voting Shares Don’t Have a Pretty History, BLOOMBERG (Mar.
16, 2017, 10:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-03-16/non-voting-shares-don-thave-a-pretty-history (“The man who became the most vocal and effective opponent of non-voting
shares was a largely forgotten Harvard economist named William Zebina Ripley.”). Professor Ripley,
despite his accomplishments, has since been discredited on other grounds. See id. (“His obscurity may
have been earned by his earlier work as a promoter of ‘scientific racism’ at the turn of the century.”).
85 WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET 86-89 (1927).
86 Id. at 116.
87 William Z. Ripley, Stop, Look, Listen! The Shareholder’s Right to Adequate Information, ATLANTIC,
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1926/09/stop-look-listen-the-shareholders-right-toadequate-information/308240/ [https://perma.cc/T9GY-76F6].
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Exchange (NYSE) mandated that listed companies adopt “one vote, one share”
policies.88 Then, in 1984, General Motors sought to implement a dual-class voting
structure by issuing common stock to the public with diminished voting
entitlements of one-half vote per share.89 The NYSE lobbied the SEC to modify
its policy.90 The SEC declined and proffered its own rule to regulate dual-class
structures in 1988.91 Rule 19c–4 purported to prohibit “disenfranchisement” by
banning national securities exchanges “from listing stock of a corporation that takes
any corporate action with the effect of nullifying, restricting or disparately reducing
the per share voting rights of existing common stockholders.”92 Ultimately,
however, the D.C. Circuit struck down this rule and held that the SEC had
overstepped its authority as granted under section 19 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.93 Further, the D.C. Circuit held that “the SEC’s authority over
shareholder voting is limited to disclosure and process; the SEC has no authority
over the substance of shareholder voting, including the number of votes shares can
possess. The substance of shareholder voting thus is solely and exclusively a matter
for state corporate law.”94 In the aftermath, securities exchanges “adopted new
listing standards governing the use of dual class stock.”95
C. Prevalence of Unequal Voting Structures
Today, publicly traded dual-class companies have an aggregate market
capitalization in excess of three trillion dollars.96 The prevalence of dual-class
voting structures has been on the rise.97 In fact, nearly 20% of 2017 IPOs in

Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Perpetual Dual Class Stock Versus the SEC’s Dubious Raised Eyebrow
Power, WLF LEGAL PULSE (Feb. 23, 2018), https://wlflegalpulse.com/2018/02/23/perpetual-dualclass-stock-versus-the-secs-dubious-raised-eyebrow-power/ [https://perma.cc/3XQ7-M5YY].
95 Id.
96 See Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 21, at 594.
97 See, e.g., John Plender, Dropbox IPO Is Yet Another Corporate Governance Low Point, FINANCIAL
TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/4333c554-279a-11e8-b27e-cc62a39d57a0 (“[Dualclass] listings increased in the US from 487 in 2005 to 701 in 2015, an eye-catching 44 per cent rise.
Among those issuers have been high-profile tech companies such as Facebook, Groupon, LinkedIn,
TripAdvisor and Zynga.”); Tom Zanki, More Cos. Authorizing No-Vote Shares Despite Resistance,
LAW360 (July 12, 2017, 8:37 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/943458/more-cos-authorizingno-vote-shares-despite-resistance [https://perma.cc/4C3R-CWXU] (“More companies are
establishing the right to issue nonvoting shares at their initial public offering through a triple-class
stock structure, venturing beyond dual-class setups that already contain unequal voting rights favoring
management’s ability to maintain long-term control, despite objections from institutional groups who
say the practice erodes accountability.”).
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
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the United States employed a structure with disproportionate voting rights.98
By some estimates, 10% of all publicly traded companies in the U.S. “have
some form of dual-class structure.”99 More specifically, as of March 2018, over
two hundred Russell 3000 U.S. incorporated companies “have at least two
outstanding classes of common stock with unequal voting rights.”100 Further,
approximately 25% of these Russell 3000 dual-class stock companies have at
least one class of common stock that is completely nonvoting.101 Snap Inc.
appears to be the only company today that exclusively uses nonvoting stock
for its publicly traded shares.102
When Google went public, its insiders readily admitted that its then dual-class
structure was considered “unusual” for a technology business, although not
uncommon for a modern media enterprise.103 Less than one decade later, Google’s
98 Large Majority of 2017 IPOs were One Share, One Vote, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INV.,
https://www.cii.org/files/Board%20Accountability/2017%20IPO%20Stats%20for%20Website.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GHN5-7Q3R] (last visited Oct. 20, 2018). Specifically, of the 124 IPOs launched
in 2017—excluding foreign private issuers, special purpose acquisition companies, and master
limited partnerships—twenty-three utilized dual-class structures with unequal voting rights, and
four employed nonvoting shares. Id.
99 DAVID LARCKER & BRIAN TAYAN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MATTERS: A CLOSER
LOOK AT ORGANIZATIONAL CHOICES AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES 65 (2d ed. 2016). This
statistic is based on 2014 data. Id. at 76 n.24.
100 Dual Class Companies List, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INV., https://www.cii.org/files/
Board%20Accountability/Dual%20Class%20Company%20List%202018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3SZCMTGZ] (last visited Oct. 20, 2018). Interestingly, there is a handful of companies with dual-class stock
structures that have two equity securities that are both publicly traded on major market exchanges,
including Alphabet Inc. (tickers GOOG and GOOGL); Under Armour Inc. (tickers UA and UAA);
Twenty-First Century Fox Inc. (tickers FOXA and FOX); Discovery Communications, Inc. (tickers
DISCA and DISCK); Viacom, Inc. (tickers VIA and VIAB); and News Corp. (tickers NWS and NWSA).
See Karen Wallace, Which Stock Share Class Should You Buy?, MORNINGSTAR (Aug. 8, 2017, 5:00 AM),
http://news.morningstar.com/articlenet/article.aspx?id=820137 [https://perma.cc/TV8M-XLK7] (listing
companies with multiple share classes and tickers); Bermuda Meister, FOX vs. FOXA: Unusual Disparity
Between Voting and Non-Voting Shares, SEEKING ALPHA (Dec. 26, 2016), https://seekingalpha.com/article/
4032703-fox-vs-foxa-unusual-disparity-voting-non-voting-shares [https://perma.cc/2959-XYV2] (listing
public companies with public voting stock and public nonvoting stock).
101 Dual Class Companies List, supra note 100. This descriptive statistic was based on a
computational analysis of CII’s compiled raw data.
102 See Snap Inc., Final Prospectus (Form 424B4) at 7 (Mar. 1, 2017) [hereinafter Snap
Prospectus] (“We are not aware of any other company that has completed an initial public offering
of non-voting stock on a U.S. stock exchange.”).
103 See Google Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) at iii (Apr. 29, 2004) (“The New York
Times Company, the Washington Post Company and Dow Jones, the publisher of The Wall Street
Journal, [as of 2004] all have similar dual class ownership structures.”). Media companies used dualclass structures to protect journalistic integrity and “focus on journalism ahead of profit.” Andrew
Ross Sorkin & Geraldine Fabrikantoct, Big Holder Sells Stake in Times Co., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18,
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/18/business/media/18paper.html; see also Katie Bentel &
Gabriel Walter, Dual Class Shares (Spring 2016) (unpublished seminar paper, University of
Pennsylvania), http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/fisch_2016/2 [https://perma.cc/V33L-CX7R]
(“Dual class stocks were first utilized in media companies as a means to protect the journalistic
integrity of the news.”).

2019]

The Corporate Practice of Gerrymandering

515

cofounders professed that “[g]iven Google’s success, it’s unsurprising that this
type of dual-class governance structure is now somewhat standard among newer
technology companies.”104 Notable examples of technology businesses that
launched IPOs with dual-class structures besides Alphabet and Snap include Blue
Apron, Facebook, and Zynga105 as well as Dropbox106 and Spotify.107 Most
recently, in 2019, Lyft108 and Pinterest109 are the latest nascent technology
businesses to utilize dual-class governance structures.

Page & Brin, supra note 6.
See, e.g., Caitlin Huston, Snap Backlash, Facebook Capitulation Won’t Stop Founder-Friendly
Stock Structures, MARKETWATCH (Sept. 27, 2017, 7:24 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/
snap-backlash-facebook-capitulation-wont-stop-multi-class-stock-structures-2017-09-22
[https://perma.cc/2WDB-QBBN] (arguing that “dual-class structures that offer limited voting
powers are likely here to stay”).
106 See Dropbox, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) at 158 (Feb. 23, 2018) (“The rights of
the holders of Class A common stock, Class B common stock, and Class C common stock are identical,
except with respect to voting and conversion.”); see also Maureen Farrell & Jay Greene, Dropbox Files
for Its Initial Public Offering, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 23, 2018, 5:54 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
dropbox-files-to-go-public-1519419035 [https://perma.cc/48JB-PWES] (“Despite a pushback against
dual-class shares from index funds and the SEC in recent months, Dropbox will have a dual-class
structure that gives the founders and some investors 10 votes a share, compared with one vote a share
for investors buying shares in the public markets.”).
107 See Spotify Technology S.A., Registration Statement (Form F-1) at 2 (Feb. 28, 2018) (“Each
outstanding ordinary share entitles the holder thereof to one vote. In addition, we have issued ten
beneficiary certificates . . . [to] our founders . . . . The beneficiary certificates carry no economic
rights and are issued to provide the holders of such beneficiary certificates additional voting rights.”);
see also Lucas Shaw, Spotify’s Founders Aren’t Giving Up Control Any Time Soon, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 20,
2018, 8:22 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-21/spotify-s-founders-aren-tgiving-up-control-any-time-soon (“[Spotify’s founders] own a class of stock that assures their hold on
the company after the shares begin trading . . . . Another class will be tradeable by investors.”).
108 See Lyft, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) at 11 (Mar. 1, 2019) (“The dual class
structure of our common stock will have the effect of concentrating voting power with our CoFounders . . . which will limit your ability to influence corporate matters, including the election of
directors, amendments of our organizational documents and any merger, consolidation, sale of all or
substantially all of our assets or other major corporate transactions."); see also Shannon Bond,
Investors Call for Lyft to Scrap Dual-Class Share Structure Plans, FINANCIAL TIMES (Mar. 17, 2019),
https://www.ft.com/content/7d26dca6-4747-11e9-b168-96a37d002cd3 ("With a dual-class structure,
Lyft is basically shielding itself and company insiders against shareholders who deserve a voice.").
109 See Pinterest, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) at 7 (Mar. 22, 2019) (“The dual class
structure of our common stock will have the effect of concentrating voting control with those
stockholders who held our capital stock prior to the completion of this offering, including our cofounders, executive officers, employees and directors and their affiliates. This will limit or preclude
your ability to influence corporate matters."); see also Olivia Zaleski & Selina Wang, Pinterest Joins U.S.
IPO Wave with Fast Revenue Growth, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 22, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2019-03-22/pinterest-joins-wave-of-upcoming-unicorn-ipos-with-u-s-filing ("Pinterest will
have a dual-class structure, with its Class B shares carrying the voting rights of 20 ordinary shares.").
104
105
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D. Empirical Analysis of Unequal Voting Structures
Statistical analysis has long revealed that when a corporation has two classes
of common stock outstanding that differ only with regards to voting rights, the
class with superior voting rights often trades at a premium relative to the class
with inferior voting rights.110 Such price differentials have historically been found
to be within a range of three to five percent across various empirical studies.111
One recent study conducted by Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. (ISS)
found that “[c]ontrolled companies generally underperformed non-controlled
firms . . . in terms of total shareholder returns, revenue growth, and return on
equity.”112 Still, the explanation for these findings is not necessarily causal in
nature since the results may be subject to omitted variable bias and fraught with
endogeneity issues. For example, the premium for superior voting shares may
be due to confounding factors such as family control.113 In fact, an empirical
study of stock market returns found that dual-class firms with controlling
families generate excess returns while dual-class firms without family owners
“bear no significant relation to stock returns.”114 This same study concludes “that
a super voting arrangement—in-and-of itself—does not appear to be
inconsistent with the goal of shareholder wealth maximization.”115
Nonetheless, one statistical analysis of dual-class shares used clever
empirics to mitigate endogeneity concerns and “disentangle the incentive and
entrenchment effects in the relationship of insider ownership and firm
value.”116 On average, “insiders have approximately 60% of the voting rights

110 See Ronald C. Lease, John J. McConnell & Wayne H. Mikkelson, The Market Value of Control
in Publicly-Traded Corporations, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 439, 458 (1983) (finding that “when corporations have
only voting and non-voting common stock outstanding, the voting stock trades at a premium” and that
when corporations have two classes of voting common stock but one class has “voting rights that can
be identified as being superior . . . , the one with superior voting rights trades at a premium”).
111 Aaron Stumpf & Andrew Cline, Price Differentials Between Voting and Nonvoting Stock, STOUT,
https://www.stoutadvisory.com/insights/article/price-differentials-between-voting-and-nonvoting-stock
[https://perma.cc/8LUD-KN97] (last visited Oct. 20, 2018). But cf. Ronald J. Gilson, Evaluating Dual
Class Common Stock: The Relevance of Substitutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 807, 808-09 (1987) (“A stock’s limited
voting rights are reflected in a reduced price, so that the company’s owners at the time it goes public,
and not the purchasers, bear the cost.”).
112 Press Release, Inv’r Responsibility Research Ctr. Inst., Controlled Companies Generally
Underperform and Boards Less Diverse, New Study Finds (Mar. 17, 2016), http://irrcinstitute.org/
news/controlled-companies-generally-underperform-and-boards-less-diverse-new-study-finds/
[https://perma.cc/M3WM-U2RA].
113 See Ronald Anderson, Ezgi Ottolenghi & David Reeb, The Dual Class Premium: A Family Affair 2,
5 (Fox Sch. Bus., Research Paper No. 17-021, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
3006669 (finding an “association between founding family ownership and dual class firms” and further
“suggesting [that] the premium centers on family control rather than dual class shares”).
114 Id. at 5.
115 Id. at 8.
116 Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, supra note 15, at 1084.
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and 40% of the cash-flow rights in dual-class firms.”117 Further, in
approximately “one-third of all dual-class firms, the insiders have a majority of
the voting rights [amounting to effective control] but do not have a majority of
the cash-flow rights.”118 The researchers found that “firm value is positively
associated with insiders’ cash-flow rights and negatively associated with
insiders’ voting rights, and negatively associated with the wedge between the
two.”119 As the disparity between voting rights and economic rights for insiders’
ownership interest in the firm grows, firm value decreases. With unequal voting
structures, not only does the class of stock with inferior voting rights trade at a
relative discount to the class of stock with superior voting rights, but all
shareholders, regardless of class of stock held, suffer from lower valuations.
E. Normative Arguments For and Against “One Share, One Vote”
There are reasonable arguments on both sides of the “one share, one vote”
debate. Dual-class stock structures enable entrepreneurs to retain corporate
control while focusing on long-term value creation without fear of
shareholder retribution for short-term performance hiccups. However, the
risk is that dual-class structures can also misalign incentives, promote
entrenchment, and expropriate resources because founders with corporate
control can outvote ordinary shareholders.
1.

Arguments in Favor of “One Share, One Vote”

Arguments for “one share, one vote” regimes are often viewed through an
economic lens by adopting a contractarian theory and surmising that “a
corporation is just a name for a great web of contractual arrangements.”120
Id. at 1053.
Id. at 1056-57.
Id. at 1084. “Wedge” is defined as “insider voting rights minus insider cash-flow rights.” Id.
at 1073; cf. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Cost of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 409,
410-11 (2005) (finding that staggered boards—arrangements that protect incumbent board
members—are associated with a statistically significant and economically meaningful reduction in
firm value, while controlling for other governance provisions).
120 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395,
401 (1983) [hereinafter Easterbook & Fischel, Voting] (citing Michael Jensen & Wiliam Meckling,
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305
(1976)). But see LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING
SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 8 (2012) (listing
“incorrect factual claims about the economic structure of corporations, including the mistaken claims
that shareholders ‘own’ corporations, that they have the only residual claim on the firm’s profits, and
that they are ‘principals’ who hire and control directors to act as their ‘agents’”); Anat R. Admati, A
Skeptical View of Financialized Corporate Governance, 31 J. ECON. PERSP. 131, 132 (2017) (asserting that
“[t]he important real-world issues around corporate governance do not fit neatly into most common
economic frameworks and models”). See generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R.
117
118
119
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Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel, proponents of shareholder value
maximization theory as well as “one share, one vote” voting policies, assert
that the “shareholders are the residual claimants to the firm’s income” and
claim that “the shareholders are the group with the appropriate incentives . . .
to make discretionary decisions.”121 They go on to argue that “[t]he
shareholders receive most of the marginal gains and incur most of the marginal
costs. They therefore have the right incentives to exercise discretion.”122
To put it succinctly, “[t]he case for the one share, one vote rule turns
primarily on its ability to match economic incentives with voting power and
to preserve the market for corporate control as a check on bad management.”123
Dual-class governance structures promote the shifting of control “from good
hands to bad because those who are willing to abuse control will often value it
more than those who will not.”124 As Easterbrook and Fischel argue,
[A]lthough the collective choice problem prevents dispersed shareholders
from making the decisions day by day, managers’ knowledge that they are
being monitored by those who have the right incentives, and the further
knowledge that the claims could be aggregated and votes exercised at any
time, tends to cause managers to act in [the] shareholders’ interest in order
to advance their own careers and to avoid being ousted.125

The fact that coalitions of shareholders may gain control for any period
of time is seen as advantageous since this can minimize the collective choice
problem that remains.126 Although a coalition of shareholders may collectively
amass effective control, economic efficiency is achieved when minority
shareholders have an equal opportunity of joining a succeeding coalition.127
As disparity between voting rights and economic rights grows, agency costs
and monitoring costs increase.128

FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 1-39 (1991) (arguing that the rules
and enforcement mechanisms of corporate law replicate contractual provisions governing managers,
investors, and other constituencies involved).
121 Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting, supra note 120, at 403.
122 Id.
123 Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 1911, 1945-46 (1996).
124 Id. at 1946.
125 Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting, supra note 120, at 403.
126 Id. at 406.
127 See id. (“So long as each share has an equal chance of participating in a winning coalition,
the gains from monitoring will be apportioned so as to preserve appropriate incentives at the
margin.” (emphasis added)).
128 Id. at 409 (“The greater the departure from equal weighting of votes among residual
claimants, the greater the (unnecessary) agency costs.”).
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2. Arguments Against “One Share, One Vote”
In contrast, viewed through this same economic lens and given the collective
choice problem, opponents may argue that voting rights ought to “be held by a
small group with good access to information—the managers themselves.”129 Some
scholars oppose the conventional wisdom evinced by Easterbrook and Fischel and
argue that the “one share, one vote” paradigm is rooted in flawed assumptions
since shareholders do not necessarily have uniform preferences.130 Others pose the
“question of whether dual-class firms possess . . . countervailing governance
mechanisms such as outside directors, family ties, stronger pay-for-performance,
or stronger monitoring by outside blockholders.”131
Those who promote dual-class regimes and the ability of companies to
deviate from the “one share, one vote” rule put forth private ordering
arguments and contend that “informed parties will choose optimal
arrangements on their own.”132 With dual-class voting structures,
“[m]anagement . . . is protected from losing their positions without their
consent” and “non-controlling shareholders are . . . protected from coercive
takeover tactics and from making the mistake of selling the company too
cheaply because they lack information possessed by the controlling
shareholders.”133 Additionally, controllers “may use super voting shares to
mitigate asymmetric information problems [and] protect firm specific
investments.”134 Simply stated, “the founder of a company may have the
special skills and deep knowledge of a specific industry and business to make
her uniquely fit to be at the helm.”135

Id. at 403.
See generally Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 775
(2005) (arguing that the preferences of shareholders are not likely to be homogenous, particularly
when they hold “economically encumbered” or “legally encumbered” shares).
131 Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, supra note 15, at 1059 (internal citations omitted). For example,
some researchers have suggested that debt may be used as an “alternative control mechanism” in
firms with dual-class structures. Id.
132 Black & Kraakman, supra note 123, at 1946; see also Bernard Sharfman, A Private Ordering
Defense of a Company’s Right To Use Dual Class Structures in IPOs, 63 VILL. L. REV. 1 (2018) (“[T]he use
of the dual class share structure in IPOs is a value-enhancing result of the bargaining that takes place
in the private ordering of corporate governance arrangements . . . .”); David J. Berger, Dual Class Stock
and Private Ordering: A System That Works, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG.
(May 24, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/05/24/dual-class-stock-and-private-ordering-asystem-that-works [https://perma.cc/KR7V-FXUF] (“Private ordering allows boards, investors, and
other corporate stakeholders to determine the most appropriate capital structure for a particular
company, given its specific needs.”).
133 Gilson, supra note 111, at 811. See generally Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d
48 (Del. Ch. 2011) (providing a more in-depth discussion on the threat of substantive coercion and
the use of poison pills as an alternative defensive measure).
134 Anderson et al., supra note 113, at 4.
135 Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 21, at 604.
129
130
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Some opponents of “one share, one vote” regimes have further advanced
such private ordering arguments by reasoning that “nonvoting shares can be
used to allocate voting power to informed investors who value their voting
rights and are motivated to use them to maximize the firm’s value.”136 These
opponents conjecture that the use of nonvoting shares may be used to reduce
agency and transaction costs.137 The underlying rationale is that
there may be companies that are made worse off when all shareholders vote.
Some shareholders, including many retail investors, have no interest in
learning about the company and prefer to free-ride off informed investors.
Other passive shareholders, such as index funds, may lack financial incentives
to vote intelligently because of their investment strategy.138

In other words, passive shareholders may contribute to agency costs by
choosing to vote if they are uninformed or apathetic.
However, these same advocates of nonvoting shares admit that one
complication is that “the effect of issuing nonvoting stock has generally been to
keep voting control with company insiders, rather than empower outside
investors.”139 They further point out that “the presence of nonvoting shares
could exacerbate the collective action, free riding, and passivity problems
inherent in dispersed ownership” but still conclude that this issue is ultimately
unlikely.140
SEC Commissioner Robert J. Jackson, Jr., summarizes the debate over “one
share, one vote” and dual-class structures quite succinctly: “On one hand, you have
visionary founders who want to retain control while gaining access to our public
markets. On the other, you have a structure that undermines accountability:
management can outvote ordinary investors on virtually anything.”141
II. THE SCOPE OF LEGAL RIGHTS FOR NONVOTING SHARES
Part II explores the legal rights and entitlements for nonvoting shares of
common stock. Specifically, Section II.A examines legal rights under state law
and Section II.B explores legal rights under federal law and stock exchange rules.
136 Dorothy Shapiro Lund, Nonvoting Shares and Efficient Corporate Governance, 71 STANFORD
L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 5) (available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3028173).
137 Id. at 4 (“[A] company that offers nonvoting shares to the public can lower its cost of capital
in certain cases . . . because it reduces inefficiencies associated with voting.”).
138 Dorothy Shapiro Lund, The Case for Nonvoting Stock, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 5, 2017, 7:10 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-case-for-nonvoting-stock-1504653033.
139 Lund, supra note 136, at 7.
140 Id. at 34.
141 Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Perpetual Dual-Class Stock: The
Case Against Corporate Royalty (Feb. 15, 2018) (transcript available at https://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/perpetual-dual-class-stock-case-against-corporate-royalty [https://perma.cc/KMN6-LQQU]).
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A. State Law Protections for Nonvoting Stockholders
State law provides enormous flexibility for corporations to issue stock
with different voting entitlements, including stock with no voting rights at
all.142 As a general matter, a “shareholder cannot be deprived of the right to
vote . . . her stock nor may the right be essentially impaired, either by the
legislature or by the corporation, without the shareholder’s consent.”143 Thus,
it follows that nonvoting shares must be either established at the moment of
incorporation or when an amendment proposal altering voting entitlements
is put to a vote and agreed upon by affected shareholders.
Nonvoting stock is accurately defined as “[s]tock that has no voting rights
under most situations.”144 This begs the question of which circumstances can
give rise to voting entitlements for nonvoting stock. Expectedly, holders of
nonvoting common stock are granted some substantive voting rights in the
narrowest of circumstances.145
1. Appointment Rights
Nonvoting shareholders lack appointment rights altogether as they do not
participate in the election or removal of directors.146 The vestigial check that
remains is the ability for a nonvoting shareholder to petition the Court of
Chancery to determine the validity of any election147 or result of any
shareholder vote.148 Thus, the use of nonvoting stock in extreme examples can
effectively turn a traditional business corporation into what may look more
like a business trust or nonprofit corporation.149 This is concerning because
states employ a director-centric model of corporate governance, and the
142 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(a) (2018) (“Every corporation may issue 1 or more
classes of stock . . . any or all of which . . . may have such voting powers, full or limited, or no voting
powers . . . , as shall be stated and expressed in the certificate of incorporation.” (emphasis added));
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.01(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“The articles of incorporation may
authorize one or more classes or series of shares that . . . have special, conditional, or limited voting
rights, or no right to vote . . . .”) (emphasis added)).
143 FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 36, § 2025.
144 Stock, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added).
145 For example, just six DGCL sections appear to affirmatively bolster statuary provisions
with language containing “whether voting or nonvoting” or “whether or not entitled to vote.” DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 204, 242, 251, 266, 355, 390 (2018).
146 See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text.
147 See tit. 8, § 225(a) (“Upon application of any stockholder . . . the Court of Chancery may
hear and determine the validity of any election, appointment, removal or resignation of any director
or officer of any corporation . . . .”).
148 See tit. 8, § 225(b) (“Upon application of any stockholder . . . , the Court of Chancery may hear and
determine the result of any vote of stockholders upon matters other than the election of directors or officers.”).
149 Armour et al., supra note 31, at 12 (“Th[e] requirement of an elected board distinguishes the
corporate form from other legal forms, such as nonprofit corporations or business trusts, which permit
or require a board structure, but do not require election of the board by the firm’s (beneficial) owners.”).
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inability to vote in directorial elections eradicates a fundamental check
shareholders have on directors and directorial decisionmaking.150
2. Decision Rights
Shareholders of nonvoting common stock have only minimal decision
rights. They cannot vote to approve many major transactions, including
mergers, asset sales, or dissolution.151 Nonvoting stockholders can vote in only
the most extreme fundamental change resolutions such as business entity
conversions152 and transfers of domestication.153 Holders of nonvoting stock
can affirmatively vote on proposed amendments to a certificate of
incorporation in a few enumerated contexts.154
3. Information Rights
Shareholders of nonvoting stock enjoy limited information rights. The
default rule is that holders of nonvoting shares are generally not entitled to
notice of a shareholders’ meeting unless they are entitled to vote on a matter
at such a meeting.155 Instead, such shareholders are only specifically entitled
to notice of defective corporate acts156 and of merger agreements.157

See supra notes 123–125 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text.
See tit. 8, § 266(b) (“[A] resolution [of conversion] shall be submitted to the stockholders
. . . . If all outstanding shares of stock of the corporation, whether voting or nonvoting, shall be
voted for the adoption of the resolution, the conversion shall be authorized.”).
153 See tit. 8, § 390(b) (“[A] resolution [to transfer to, or domesticate, or continue in a foreign
jurisdiction] shall be submitted to the stockholders . . . . If all outstanding shares of stock of the
corporation, whether voting or nonvoting, shall be voted for the adoption of the resolution, the
corporation shall file . . . a certificate of transfer . . . .”).
154 See tit. 8, § 242(b)(2) (specifying that nonvoting shareholders can cast votes if an
amendment would change the number of authorized shares, change the par value of their shares, “or
alter or change the powers, preferences, or special rights of the shares of such class so as to affect
them adversely”); see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.04(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“If a
proposed amendment would affect a series of a class of shares in one or more of the [specifically
enumerated] ways . . . the holders of shares of that series are entitled to vote as a separate voting
group on the proposed amendment.”).
155 See tit. 8, § 222(b) (“[W]ritten notice of any meeting shall be given . . . to each stockholder
entitled to vote at such meeting . . . .” (emphasis added)); see also R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI ET AL.,
MEETINGS OF STOCKHOLDERS, § 9.4 (3d ed., Supp. 2017) (“[T]he determination of whether or
not a class vote is required may under applicable state law determine which stockholders are entitled
to notice of a meeting.”).
156 See tit. 8, §§ 204(d), 204(g) (specifying that notice must be given to stockholders “whether
voting or nonvoting”).
157 See tit. 8, § 251(c) (“Due notice of the time, place and purpose of the meeting shall be mailed
to each holder of stock, whether voting or nonvoting, of the corporation . . . .” (emphasis added)).
150
151
152
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Interestingly, state corporate law does not address whether nonvoting
shareholders have a right to attend annual shareholder meetings.158 The fact
that nonvoting shareholders generally do not have a right of notice or a right
to vote in shareholder meetings seems to support the conclusion that such
shareholders do not have a right to attend.159 On the flip side, it is unclear
whether a nonvoting shareholder plaintiff could ever successfully argue that
controlling shareholders or directors breached their duty of candor or disclosure
in the event she is barred from attending a shareholder meeting.160 Directors of
corporations with voting shares in the hands of insiders and nonvoting shares
in the hands of the public could conceivably dodge annual shareholder meetings
if all directors are perpetually elected by unanimous written consent.161
Although any shareholder may petition the Court of Chancery in an attempt
to compel an annual meeting under certain circumstances,162 a nonvoting
shareholder is likely to be unsuccessful under DGCL section 211 if the voting
shareholders regularly act by unanimous written consent.163
4. Inspection Rights
Likewise, it is unclear whether and to what extent nonvoting stockholders
may be entitled to inspection rights, where the burden of proof is on the
158 See BALOTTI ET AL., supra note 154, § 8.3 (“[O]nly those who have the right to vote at the
meeting have an enforceable right to attend the meeting . . . . Others with legitimate interests in
the business of the corporation . . . also may be admitted to the meeting. . . . [But] any decision by
management to extend admission to others is purely discretionary.”); see also tit. 8, § 228(a)
(referencing a hypothetical “meeting at which all shares entitled to vote . . . were present” and leaving
open the possibility that nonvoting shareholders may be present on a discretionary basis (emphasis
added)); Snap Prospectus, supra note 102, at 5 (indicating that Snap “will invite holders of . . .
[nonvoting] common stock to attend [the] annual meeting of stockholders” and implying that such
invitation is discretionary rather than mandatory (emphasis added)); cf. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 957 (Del. 1985) (“Merely because the General Corporation Law is
silent as to a specific matter does not mean that it is prohibited.”).
159 Haas & Brewer, supra note 22, at 2.
160 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
161 See tit. 8, § 211(b) (“Stockholders may . . . act by [unanimous] written consent to elect
directors . . . .”).
162 See tit. 8, § 211(c) (“[I]f no date has been designated, for a period of 13 months after . . .
[either] its last annual meeting or the last action by written consent to elect directors . . . , the Court
of Chancery may . . . order a meeting to be held upon the application of any stockholder or director.”).
163 See Haas & Brewer, supra note 22, at 3 n.22 (“[Section 211] does not specify that the ‘unanimous’
written consent only pertains to the voting stockholders, but that is the natural conclusion because
nonvoting stockholders would not be entitled to vote to elect directors if the corporation were to hold an
annual meeting.”). On the contrary, section 228 explicitly frames written consent in terms of requisite
voting power. See tit. 8, § 228(a) (stating that actions may be taken without a meeting only where a
consent is “signed by the holders of outstanding stock having not less than the minimum number of votes
that would be necessary to authorize or take such action at a meeting at which all shares entitled to vote
thereon were present and voted”). But cf. BALOTTI ET AL., supra note 155, § 2.10 (“Attempts by
companies, even in exceptional circumstances, to avoid annual meetings, have rarely succeeded.”).
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corporation to demonstrate that the requesting shareholder has an “improper
purpose”164 or “a purpose not germane to the meeting.”165 Any shareholder
has the statutory right to inspect a company’s books and records “for any
proper purpose”.166 However, the Chancery Court “has wide latitude in
determining the proper scope of inspection . . . [and bears] the responsibility
of . . . tailor[ing] the inspection to the stockholder’s stated purpose.”167 All
shareholders also have the statutory right to examine the list of shareholders
entitled to vote “for any purpose germane to the meeting.”168 Depending on
the facts and circumstances, it is unclear whether a corporation could
successfully argue that a nonvoting shareholder does not have a “purpose
germane to the meeting” simply because she cannot vote.169 The best
counterargument would be that a nonvoting shareholder would like to
examine the shareholder list so she can identify and appeal to the shareholders
who can vote—including the controlling group.170
5. Exit Rights
What remains then is the prospect of exit rights.171 That is, one backstop
to severely limited voting rights is the ability of the nonvoting stockholder to
sell her shares in the open market—as long as the marketplace for secondary
shares is sufficiently liquid. For seasoned companies listed on major
exchanges, adequate free float generally supports liquidity in their stocks.
164 See tit. 8, § 220(c)(3) (“The burden of proof shall be upon the corporation to establish that
the inspection such stockholder seeks is for an improper purpose.”).
165 See tit. 8, § 219(b) (“The burden of proof shall be on the corporation to establish that the
examination such stockholder seeks is for a purpose not germane to the meeting.”).
166 Tit. 8, § 220(b).
167 Sec. First Corp. v. U.S. Die Casting & Dev. Co., 687 A.2d 563, 569 (Del. 1997); see also tit.
8, § 220(c) (“The Court of Chancery is hereby vested with exclusive jurisdiction to determine
whether or not the person seeking inspection is entitled to the inspection sought.”); tit. 8,
§ 220(c)(3) (“The Court may, in its discretion, prescribe any limitations or conditions with reference
to the inspection, or award such other or further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.”).
168 Tit. 8, § 219(a).
169 See Haas & Brewer, supra note 22, at 4 n.32 (remarking that a “corporation could take the
position that the only purpose ‘germane to the meeting’ is voting, and that only a holder of voting
stock can have that purpose”). But see 1 R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN,
DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 7.15 (3d ed. 2018 & Supp.
2018) (“The purpose of a stockholder list is to give stockholders information necessary to making or
influencing voting decisions . . . .” (emphasis added)).
170 See Magill v. N. Am. Refractories Co., 128 A.2d 233, 237 (Del. 1956) (“Until the polls are
closed a stockholder may change his vote, and one stockholder has the right to attempt to persuade
another to do so.”).
171 Cf. Armour et al., supra note 38, at 49 (noting that “where share ownership is dispersed in the
hands of passive, uninformed investors, . . . appointment and decision rights are less effective, and more
work is done by agent incentives” supported by standards of conduct and “disclosure rules to ensure
more informed share prices and greater liquidity, which in turn make exit rights . . . more effective”).
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However, empirical research suggests that shares of dual-class firms may suffer
from higher premiums demanded by marketmakers and greater order
execution difficulty.172 It is evident then that exit rights alone are a weak form
of protection for shareholders, and more must be done to facilitate liquidity
and promote greater market efficiency.173
B. Other Legal Privileges for Nonvoting Stockholders
The scope of other legal privileges and entitlements for nonvoting shares
stems from various stock exchange rules and federal regulations, most notably
securities laws.
1. Stock Exchange Rules
To start, the major stock exchanges in the U.S. mandate that listed
companies hold annual shareholder meetings.174 The NYSE employs
additional protections for holders of nonvoting common stock that go beyond
the bounds of both state corporate law and federal securities laws. Specifically,
the NYSE mandates that listed shares of nonvoting stock “meet all original
listing standards”; all rights, apart from voting entitlements, should be
“substantially the same” for both nonvoting and voting common stock; and
“holders of any listed nonvoting common stock must receive all
communications . . . sent generally to the holders of the voting securities of
the listed company.”175 However, the Nasdaq contains no comparable
provisions.176 On the contrary, the Nasdaq has been vocal in advocating for
the use of dual-class stock structures.177

172 See Joonghyuk Kim et al., Dual-Class Stock Splits and Liquidity 22 (Apr. 24, 2007) (unpublished
manuscript), https://weatherhead.case.edu/departments/banking-and-finance/Documents/Dualclassstocksplits_04242007.pdf [https://perma.cc/UGH7-ELCU] (“[I]nvestors face higher effective spreads,
trades have larger price impact, and order execution difficulty increases following dual-class splits.”).
173 See supra note 171.
174 See NASDAQ STOCK MARKET, LISTING RULES Rule 5620(a) (“Each Company listing
common stock or voting preferred stock . . . shall hold an annual meeting of Shareholders no later
than one year after the end of the Company’s fiscal year-end . . . .”); NEW YORK STOCK
EXCHANGE, LISTED COMPANY MANUAL Rule 302.00 (“Listed companies are required to hold an
annual shareholders’ meeting during each fiscal year.”).
175 NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, Rule 313.00.
176 See Haas & Brewer, supra note 22, at 3 n.26 (“Nasdaq does not appear to have a comparable
rule [to that of the NYSE].”).
177 See Friedman, supra note 29 (noting that Nasdaq believes dual-class structures can be beneficial
since they “allow investors to invest side-by-side with innovators and high-growth companies”).
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2. Federal Laws
Federal securities laws do little to enlarge the rights of nonvoting
stockholders, particularly when a company exclusively issues nonvoting stock
to the public.178 Federal securities laws significantly constrain the information
rights and entitlements of nonvoting shareholders and even limit legal causes
of action and remedies for nonvoting shareholders.
Federal securities laws generally require companies with equity securities
registered under section 12 of the Exchange Act to disseminate proxy
materials or equivalent information statement when soliciting shareholder
action.179 However, under section 14(c) of the Exchange Act, this mandate is
inapplicable to corporations that only register nonvoting common stock.180
Consequentially, “legal causes of action and remedies under Section 14 . . .
for inadequate or misleading information . . . may not be available to holders
of [nonvoting] common stock.”181 Snap Inc., which only issued nonvoting
stock to the public, aptly disclosed these issues in its prospectus to
investors.182 Snap Inc. further revealed that material information would be
shared with investors through Form 8-K filings after corporate actions are
taken—rather than through proxy statements or information statements
which would otherwise contain more information and be shared before

178 In other contexts, it is interesting to note that federal regulations prohibit nonvoting shares
altogether. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 prohibits nonvoting shares in reorganized
companies. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(6) (2012) (“[A] plan shall . . . provide for the inclusion in the
charter of the [corporate] debtor . . . of a provision prohibiting the issuance of nonvoting equity
securities . . . .”). The Investment Company Act of 1940 prohibits nonvoting shares in registered
management companies. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(i) (“[E]very share of stock hereafter issued by a
registered management company . . . shall be a voting stock and have equal voting rights with every
other outstanding voting stock . . . .”).
179 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)(1) (“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . to solicit . . . any
proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any security (other than an exempt security) . . . .”).
180 See Exchange Act Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14c-2(a) (“[T]he registrant shall transmit [an
information statement] to every security holder of the class that is entitled to vote . . . in regard to any
matter to be acted upon . . . .” (emphasis added)); see also Johnston v. Wilbourn, 682 F. Supp. 879,
883 (S.D. Miss. 1988) (“[S]ection 14(a) applies only to securities registered pursuant to section 12 of
the 1934 Act . . . .”); R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI ET AL., supra note 155, § 4.3 (“Issuers subject to the
reporting requirements solely by virtue of having filed a registration statement under the Securities
Act of 1933 are not subject to the proxy rules.”).
181 Snap Prospectus, supra note 102, at 40; see also J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964)
(stating that Section 14(a) is intended to prevent “management . . . from obtaining authorization for
corporate action by means of deceptive or inadequate disclosure in proxy solicitation” and to “control
the conditions under which proxies may be solicited” to prevent abuses that frustrate the free exercise
of stockholders’ voting rights (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
182 See Snap Prospectus, supra note 102, at 5 (explaining that because the common stock is
nonvoting and the “only class of stock registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act,” Snap would
“not be required to file proxy statements or information statements under Section 14 of the
Exchange Act unless a vote of the Class A common stock is required by applicable law”).

2019]

The Corporate Practice of Gerrymandering

527

corporate actions are taken.183 This delay in reporting material information
can be injurious to investors who may trade shares “after a material event has
taken place but before [the company has] disclosed any information about
that event.”184 Snap’s rationale for dissemination of any information is
perhaps rooted in its desire to discharge its duty of candor or disclosure.185
Another cause for alarm is the fact that when a company exclusively issues
nonvoting stock to the public, its significant shareholders are exempt from
reporting obligations under sections 13(d) and 13(g) of the Exchange Act and can
therefore lawfully evade periodic disclosure of beneficial ownership.186 Further,
“significant stockholders, other than directors and officers, are exempt from the
‘short-swing’ profit recovery provisions of Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act.”187
In the case of Snap, consistent with Delaware corporate law, nonvoting
stockholders are barred from nominating directors and from bringing matters
before the annual meeting of shareholders.188 To make matters worse,
nonvoting stockholders are not eligible to submit shareholder proposals under
rule 14a-8 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.189
Furthermore, a corporation that is classified as an “emerging growth
company” under the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act of 2012
may elect to conform with reduced reporting requirements.190 For example,
Snap is not required to have its independent registered public accounting
firm audit internal controls over financial reporting under the SarbanesOxley Act, has reduced disclosure requirements regarding executive
compensation, and is not required to hold nonbinding advisory votes on
Id.
Id.
Id. (indicating that material information would be disclosed “to ensure equal access and fair
disclosure”).
186 See Exchange Act Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(i) (2018) (“[T]he term ‘equity security’ . . . shall
not include securities of a class of non-voting securities.”); see also Snap Prospectus, supra note 102, at 40.
187 Snap Prospectus, supra note 102, at 40; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2012) (“[A]ny profit
realized by [a director or officer] from any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity
security of such issuer . . . within any period of less than six months . . . shall inure to and be
recoverable by the issuer . . . .”); Gibbons v. Malone, 703 F.3d 595, 604 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[W]e hold
that an insider’s purchase and sale of shares of different types of stock in the same company does
not trigger liability under § 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b), where
those securities are separately traded, nonconvertible, and come with different voting rights.”);
Exchange Act Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3 (setting forth conditions by which a transaction between
an issuer and its officers or directors would be exempt from Section 16(b)).
188 See Snap Prospectus, supra note 102, at 40 (“[H]olders of our Class A common stock will be unable
to bring matters before our annual meeting of stockholders or nominate directors at such meeting . . . .”).
189 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b) (“In order to be eligible to submit a proposal, you must have
continuously held at least $2,000 in market value, or 1%, of the company’s securities entitled to be voted on
the proposal at the meeting for at least one year by the date you submit the proposal.” (emphasis added)).
190 See Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 101(a)(19), 126 Stat. 306, 309 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a(19), 78a
note (2012)) (defining an “emerging growth company” as a business with “total annual gross revenues of
less than $1,000,000,000”).
183
184
185

528

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 167: 497

executive compensation under the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010.191 Further, as long as a company exclusively
has publicly traded, nonvoting stock outstanding, it will effectively bypass
“say-on-pay” and “say-on-frequency” provisions of Dodd–Frank.192
III. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO ISSUES POSED BY NONVOTING
SHARES
Current forms of regulation do not adequately address the problems
posed by nonvoting stock. I advocate for the use of a novel multipronged
framework for regulating nonvoting stock. Part III explores current and
prospective solutions to the issues posed by nonvoting stock. Section III.A
canvases approaches that are already in the marketplace and argues that they
are deficient. Section III.B advances a new multipronged framework for
regulating nonvoting stock.
A. Current Approaches to Regulating Dual-Class Structures
There are a variety of ways that the current marketplace regulates the use
of dual-class shares. Two forms of regulation, namely sunset provisions and
guaranteed minimum board seat representation, are supported by private
ordering arguments since corporate stakeholders—rather than an external
regulating body—determine the capital structure. Other approaches include
notions of requiring nonvoting stock to be a form of preferred stock with
some type of cash flow preference and prohibiting dual-class companies from
participating in stock market indices. These last two forms of regulation are
supported by arguments favoring some manner of external regulation.

Snap Prospectus, supra note 102, at 40, 44.
See Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (2012);
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-21; Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation and Golden Parachute
Compensation, Exchange Act Release No. 33-9178, 100 SEC Docket 868 (Jan. 25, 2011); Paresh Dave,
Snap Says Shareholders Won’t Have a ‘Say on Pay’ for Executives, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2017 6:40 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-live-updates-snap-ipo-snap-says-shareholders-won-t-have-a1486650128-htmlstory.html (“[S]hares with no votes are not subject to federal proxy rules designed to
give shareholders a say in corporate matters . . . .”); Haas & Brewer, supra note 22, at 1-2 (“[H]olders of
nonvoting shares cannot vote on . . . corporate governance matters, including say-on-pay votes . . . .”).
In the case of Alphabet, which has a tripartite class structure, for example, nonvoting stock does not
participate in such advisory votes. See Alphabet Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14-A) at 7 (Apr. 28,
2017) (indicating that “[h]olders of Class C capital stock have no voting power as to any items of business
that will be voted on at the Annual Meeting” and that say-on-pay vote and say-on-frequency votes shall
be held at the Annual Meeting).
191
192
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1. Mandate Sunset Provisions for Dual-Class Companies
One potential solution to regulating dual-class structures concerns
mandating the use of “sunset provisions.” Sunset arrangements only permit
dual-class structures for a set definite amount of time—subject to potential
extensions and certain triggering events.193 Examples of companies that
adopted fixed duration sunset provisions as of their IPOs include Fitbit,
Groupon, Kayak, and Yelp.194 Advocates for sunset provisions argue that “even
if a dual-class structure were to be efficient at the time of the IPO, it would
likely become inefficient many years down the road.”195 In other words, a
reduction in efficiency of dual-class companies over time necessitates the use
of “finite-life” structures vis-à-vis “perpetual” arrangements at the IPO
stage.196 To allow for flexibility, the duration of dual-class structure could be
extended if approved by a majority of the shareholders unaffiliated with the
controller.197
A second form of sunset provision in the marketplace is a “triggering-event
sunset” which mandates common stock unification from a dual-class structure
into a unitary class upon the occurrence of a stipulated event, “such as the
founder’s disability, death, or reaching of retirement age.”198 Examples of
companies that adopted triggering-event sunset provisions as of their IPOs
include Google, Groupon, LinkedIn, and Zynga.199 These arrangements
implicitly support the contention that healthy founders ought to run the
business for the foreseeable future.
A third form of sunset provision is called an “ownership-percentage
sunset” which mandates common stock unification into a single-class structure
when a controller crosses a certain predetermined ownership percentage.200
Examples of companies that adopted such provisions include LinkedIn and
Zynga.201 These arrangements support the view that a controller ought to
maintain a baseline level of economic interest to maintain sufficient
“alignment of interest” with public investors.202 In practice, these provisions
are largely symbolic in nature because thresholds are often set too low.203
193 See Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 21, at 601-02 (defining sunset provisions as mechanisms
that make the life of a dual-class structure finite).
194 Id. at 618.
195 Id. at 601.
196 Id.
197 Id. at 601-02.
198 Id. at 619.
199 Id. at 619 n.98.
200 Id. at 620.
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 Id. Recall that a controller of high-vote stock entitled to ten-to-one voting rights can hold
9.1% of the total number of shares to secure majority control. See supra note 14 and accompanying

530

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 167: 497

Both “triggering-event sunsets” and “ownership-percentage sunsets” can be
useful in conjunction with other regulations. However, mandating plain vanilla
sunset provisions with fixed dual-class durations is problematic. It is difficult
to identify the efficiency “sweet spot” for how long a company ought to
maintain a dual-class structure ex ante. A collective action problem arises ex
post when shareholders unaffiliated with the controller are allowed to vote to
extend the company’s unification date. This is because an individual
shareholder may believe it is in the best interests of the corporation to maintain
a dual-class structure but may nonetheless vote to empower herself by voting
against an extension. Additionally, in a tripartite class company, like Alphabet
or Blue Apron, it is unclear whether unaffiliated low-vote shareholders and
nonvoting shareholders ought to be treated the same or differently for voting
purposes. Further, voting on extensions could lead to concerns of empty
voting.204 For example, shrewd shareholders can borrow shares just prior to the
record date and unwind their shares immediately following the record date so
that they can vote while maintaining no economic interest.
2. Guarantee a Minimum Level of Board Representation for Low-Vote
Stockholders
An alternative approach is to have a certain fixed percentage of board seats
determined by shareholders who hold nonvoting stock or low-voting stock.
This would at least give low-voting or nonvoting shareholders a dissenting
voice on the board of directors even if their nominees would always get
overruled on matters voted upon by the board.
text. If a threshold is set at 9%, it will have no bearing on majority voting control, but will still
substantially impact voting power once triggered. Consider the same hypothetical firm discussed
previously: there are 1,000,000 shares of common stock, consisting of 90,910 high-vote shares entitled
to 10 votes per share and 909,090 low-vote shares entitled to 1 vote per share. The 90,910 high-vote
shares are entitled to 909,100 votes whereas the 909,090 low-vote shares are entitled to 909,090 votes.
The high-vote shares, representing just 9.1% of the total number of shares, would secure voting
majority control. Now, consider an ownership-percentage sunset provision set at 9%. This means that
if the controller fails to own at least 90,000 shares, its high-vote shares will be converted to low-vote
shares. Assume that the controller’s holdings of high-vote shares fall to 89,999 shares (representing
899,990 votes) and the public’s holdings of low-vote shares rise to 910,001 shares (representing 910,001
votes). At this point, the controller would have retained approximately 49.7% voting power and fallen
short of majority control. However, with this ownership-percentage sunset provision, the controller’s
shares would be converted to the same type of shares that the public enjoys, and her voting power
would fall to just under 9%. In either case, with or without this ownership-percentage sunset
provision, the controller would not have majority voting control. A low threshold is seen as ineffective
since the controller already has a strong disincentive to go below 9.1%. Table 2 in the Appendix
presents these numbers and percentages.
204 See generally Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard S. Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and
Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811 (2006) (discussing issues where investors hold
disproportionately more votes than their economic interest as well as situations where investors
possess the ability to acquire votes when needed).
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For example, Beasley Broadcast Group, Inc. has a novel dual-class
structure whereby Class A stock is entitled to one vote per share and Class B
stock is entitled to ten votes per share with respect to all matters subject to a
stockholder vote—with one notable exception.205 The one voting exception is
remarkable: all common stock holders are entitled to vote on eight of ten
board seats whereas only the low-vote Class A stockholders are entitled to
vote on the remaining two board nominations.206 This fascinating structure
accomplishes two things: it expressly guarantees low-vote stockholders to
vote on 20 percent of the board of directors207 and effectively increases the
ownership threshold for a controller to maintain majority control.208 When
used in conjunction with low-voting stock, this mechanism is functionally
similar to ownership-percentage sunset provisions, except that the “trigger”
only relates to voting in the context of director elections and not voting in all
general corporate matters.209 Beasley Broadcast Group, Inc. appears to be
unique in that only low-vote stock is entitled to a minimum fixed percentage
of board seats with the potential for even greater representation.210
In the case where the low-vote stock is generally nonvoting except for
directorial elections, such a structure would only guarantee a fixed percentage of
board seats, but have no bearing on the ownership threshold for a controller to
maintain majority control.211 This same result is achieved if the corporation
Beasley Broadcast Group, Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14-A) at 17 n.3 (Apr. 28, 2017).
Id. at 1.
Id.
Recall that a controller of high-vote stock entitled to ten-to-one voting rights can hold 9.1%
of the total number of shares to secure majority control. See supra notes 14 and 203 and accompanying
text. Consider a new hypothetical firm with 1,000,000 shares of common stock, consisting of 230,770
high-vote shares entitled to ten votes per share and 769,230 low-vote shares entitled to 1 vote per
share. Additionally, assume that there are 10 board seats and the dual-class structure is modified such
that all shareholders can vote on eight seats and only low-vote shareholders can vote on the remaining
two seats—just like Beasley Broadcast Group. The 230,770 high-vote shares are entitled to 2,307,700
votes whereas the 769,230 low-vote shares are entitled to 769,230 votes. The high-vote shares would
represent approximately 23.1% of the firm’s cash flow rights and secure just over 75.0% of the firm’s
voting rights over general corporate matters. Here, high-vote stockholders could guarantee six of ten
board seats (i.e., 75% of eight board seats for which all shareholders can vote) and the low-vote
stockholders would control the remaining four board seats (i.e., the two guaranteed board seats, plus
25% of the eight board seats). This means that a controller would need to own 23.1% of outstanding
shares—as compared to 9.1% of outstanding shares absent such a rule—to maintain board control.
209 See supra notes 200–202 and accompanying text.
210 Although it is impossible to prove a negative, this descriptive statistic was based on an analysis
of CII’s comprehensive dataset of Dual Class Companies. See Dual Class Companies List, supra note 100.
211 Consider an extreme hypothetical firm with 1,000,000 shares of common stock, consisting
of just one high-vote “golden share” entitled to one vote per share and 999,999 low-vote shares
entitled to no votes per share. See Golden Share, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/
terms/g/goldenshare.asp [https://perma.cc/T35C-M9ZD] (defining a “golden share” as “[a] type of
share that gives its shareholder veto power over changes to the company’s charter”). The one highvote share, mathematically representing just one-millionth of the total shares outstanding, would
205
206
207
208
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chooses to affix the percentage of board seats for both the low-vote and high-vote
classes’ stock. In fact, at least nine public companies have this sort of
arrangement, including The Madison Square Garden Co., The New York Times
Company, Nike, and Scholastic.212 These mechanisms are functionally similar to
what we observe with cumulative voting arrangements.213 The justification for
their use is also identical: enable minority shareholders to have directorial
representation on the board despite the presence of a controller.214 Establishing
a minimum fixed percentage of board seats to be determined by nonvoting shares
and employing a voting arrangement like that of Beasley Broadcast can be
tremendously useful for nonvoting shareholders to have board member influence.
3. Require Nonvoting Shares to Have Certain Liquidity Rights
Another potential solution is to mandate that nonvoting shares have at
least some sort of liquidity preference vis-à-vis voting common stock to
compensate shareholders for giving up their votes. Preferential shares are
generally seen as a hybrid security with debt- and equity-like characteristics.215
There can be a wide variety of rights and entitlements for preferred shares.216
Preferred stockholders may be given a priority claim on cash flows in the
event a company declares and pays a dividend or distributes assets to
shareholders.217 In this way, preferred shares are entitled to preferential
dividend rights and senior claims on assets in the event of a liquidation

secure 100% voting control. Again, assume that there are ten board seats and the dual-class structure
is modified such that all shareholders can vote on eight seats and only low-vote shareholders can
vote on the remaining two seats. The controller’s one “golden share” could guarantee eight of ten
board seats (i.e., 100% of eight board seats) and the low-vote stockholders would control the
remaining two board seats (i.e., the two guaranteed board seats, plus 0% of the eight board seats).
212 This descriptive statistic was also based on a computational analysis of CII’s compiled raw
data. See Dual Class Companies List, supra note 100.
213 Under cumulative voting, each shareholder may cast a total number of votes equal to the
number of voting shares she owns multiplied by the total number of director seats open for election.
There is just one vote en masse—rather than voting for each director one by one. Candidates who get
the most votes win. The majority cannot outvote minority voters for every director. Cumulative Voting,
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answers-cumulativevotehtm.html
[https://perma.cc/PNP5-XQJU] (last updated Oct. 14, 2014).
214 See id. (“Cumulative voting is a type of voting system that helps strengthen the ability of
minority shareholders to elect a director.”).
215 See Preferred Stock, FIDELITY INV., https://www.fidelity.com/learning-center/investmentproducts/stocks/preferred-stock [https://perma.cc/R35C-JGWU] (noting that preferred stock “has
investment performance characteristics that could combine some degree of exposure to both equity
and debt of a particular issuer”).
216 See id. (“The exact terms of preferred shareholders’ economic preference may vary from
company to company.”).
217 See id. (“Preferred shares . . . give their owners a priority claim whenever a company pays
dividends or distributes assets to shareholders.”)
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event.218 In the event that the company fails to pay a preferred dividend, “the
preferred stockholders generally gain some voting rights, so that the common
stockholders are obliged to share control of the company with the preferred
holders.”219 Furthermore, “[d]irectors are also aware that failure to pay the
preferred dividend earns the company a black mark with investors, so they do
not take such a decision lightly.”220
Alternatively, in the case of “convertible preferred stock,” the holder has
the option to convert their preferential shares into common shares of the
company.221 If the firm underperforms or runs into financial trouble, then
preferred stockholders will preserve their security and retain their senior
claim on the company’s assets in relation to the common stockholders. If the
firm performs well, then preferred stockholders will choose to convert their
investment into ordinary common stock and enjoy the upside in valuation. In
other words, preferred stockholders will only exercise the conversion option
embedded in their security if it is economical to do so.222
Interestingly, many countries in continental Europe have implemented
restrictions on dual-class structures.223 First, nonvoting publicly traded
common stock is prohibited in a majority of all OECD countries.224 Instead,
nonvoting preference shares are generally permitted in most OECD
countries except for a few countries of northern Europe.225 Again, a holder of
such financial instruments “obtains voting rights only in extreme
circumstances such as neglect of the preferential rights or bankruptcy
proceedings against the issuer.”226 For example, Germany allows nonvoting
preferred shares with preferential dividend cash flow rights “to compensate
for the absence of voting rights.”227 Many countries that prohibit nonvoting
common shares and permit nonvoting preferential shares, however, still
218 See JONATHAN BERK & PETER DEMARZO, CORPORATE FINANCE 810 (3d ed. 2014)
(“Preferred stock . . . usually has a preferential dividend and seniority in any liquidation . . . .”).
219 RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE FINANCE 350 (10th ed. 2011).
220 Id.
221 See BERK & DEMARZO, supra note 218, at 810 (“[T]his preferred stock usually gives the owner an
option to convert it into common stock on some future date, so it is often called convertible preferred stock”).
222 Id.
223 See generally OECD STEERING GRP. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE, LACK OF PROPORTIONALITY
BETWEEN OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: OVERVIEW AND ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION (2007),
http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/40038351.pdf [https://perma.cc/S4XY-P9KU]
(analyzing restrictions on multiple share classes and voting entitlements across member countries of the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)).
224 See id. at 15 (“[T]he 17 countries that do not allow such shares are mostly the ones that
prohibit either multiple-class/differentiated voting right shares or non-voting preference shares.”).
225 See id. (finding that only three OECD member countries prohibit nonvoting preference
shares—Denmark, Netherlands, and Sweden).
226 Id.
227 Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 21, at 600 n.50.
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impose restrictions on the percentage of equity capital that may be
represented by preferential shares.228
In some sense, apart from having a liquidity preference, nonvoting
preferred shares are not functionally dissimilar from triggering-event sunset
provisions, except that the “trigger” relates to the financial health of the firm’s
operations rather than the physical and mental health of the firm’s
controller.229 Mandating that low-voting public common stock receive some
form of liquidity preference is too severe, as it would completely halt the use
of dual-class structures which must be considered in the broader context of
private companies choosing to remain private for longer.230
4. Prohibit Dual-Class Companies from Participating in Stock Market Indices
One solution implemented by stock market index providers has been to
exclude new issuers of dual-class stock from participating in their market
indices. The FTSE Russell indices proposed in 2017 that “companies that have
5% or less of their voting rights in the hands of unrestricted shareholders . . .
have their securities rendered ineligible for index inclusion.”231 This measure
appeared to be aimed directly at Snap Inc. given that its public shareholders
had no voting power.232 Similarly, the S&P Dow Jones Indices announced in
2017 that the S&P Composite 1500® and component indices, including the
widely recognized S&P 500 index, will no longer include dual-class companies
on a prospective basis.233
Clearly, these exclusions are intended to have a deterring effect. As one
news commentator put it, “[j]oining the Standard & Poor’s 500—an index of
228 See id. at 621 n.103 (“The size of the cap varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. It is 33%
of the company equity capital in Belgium and Estonia; 40% in Greece; and 50% in Germany,
Luxembourg, and Spain.”).
229 See supra notes 199–200 and accompanying text.
230 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
231 FTSE Russell Voting Rights Consultation–Next Steps, FTSE RUSSELL 3 (July 2017),
http://www.ftse.com/products/downloads/FTSE_Russell_Voting_Rights_Consultation_Next_Step
s.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7E3-ZDWU].
232 See Ross Kerber & Noel Randewich, FTSE Russell to Exclude Snap from Stock Indexes over
Voting Rights, REUTERS (July 26, 2017 4:39 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-snap-russell/ftserussell-to-exclude-snap-from-stock-indexes-over-voting-rights-idUSKBN1AB2TW (indicating that
the CEO of FTSE Russell believed that “voting rights are an important issue” and proclaimed that
“[s]hareholders won’t be able to hold boards accountable if they don’t have voting rights”).
233 Press Release, S&P Dow Jones Indices, S&P Dow Jones Indices Announces Decision on
Multi-Class Shares and Voting Rules (July 31, 2017), https://www.spice-indices.com/idpfiles/spiceassets/resources/public/documents/561162_spdjimulti-classsharesandvotingrulesannouncement7.31.17.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5PRG-EPHC]. Existing multiple-class companies were “grandfathered in.” Id. Snap Inc.,
however, was excluded. See e.g., Anita Balakrishnan, Snap Is Falling Again as Wall Street Worries About the
Company’s Corporate Structure, CNBC (Aug. 31, 2017, 11:55 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/01/snapchatexcluded-from-sp-500-what-does-it-mean.html [https://perma.cc/TQ4R-VL6T] (“The [exclusion]
prevents Snap from being included in most major S&P indexes.”).
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the nation’s biggest and most popular stocks—has long been an important
mark of validation for businesses. It signals that a company has ascended to
corporate America’s elite and boosts its share price by about 5%.”234
However, consider a controlling shareholder–founder of a large private
enterprise that is contemplating the implementation of a dual-class structure
upon IPO, but is also absolutely insistent that her company is included in a
major stock market index. She could consider a tripartite class structure like
Alphabet or Blue Apron such that five percent of voting power is in the hands
of the public and become eligible for the Russell 3000 index but not the S&P
1500 index. Alternatively, she could abandon her plans of installing a dual-class
structure but implement a poison pill and classified board instead. Such
defensive measures would still provide incredibly strong antitakeover
protection without jeopardizing stock market index participation.235 It is
apparent then that these stock market index policy measures are too blunt a
tool since they can be easily circumvented. Index provider policy measures are
an inferior solution to issues posed by dual-class structures as compared to
more systematic forms of regulation which could be imposed through state
corporate law and federal securities regulation.
It is evident then that current forms of regulation do not adequately
address the problems posed by nonvoting stock.

234 Paresh Dave & Ethan Varian, S&P 500 Will Exclude Snap Because Its Stock Gives New
Shareholders No Power, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2017, 1:55 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/
hollywood/la-fi-snap-sp-20170801-story.html.
235 For an example of this kind of strategizing, see generally Air Prods. and Chems., Inc. v. Airgas,
Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 57 (Del. 2011), in which the court recognized substantive coercion as a legally
cognizable threat despite the fact that its stockholders were “sophisticated” and could make an informed
decision concerning a tender offer; the court then allowed the use of a poison pill in combination with
a staggered board as an acceptable defensive action for purposes of the two-part Unocal test. See also
Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, No. CIV.A. 9469-VCP, 2014 WL 1922029, at *21-22 (Del. Ch. May 2,
2014) (recognizing the potential for negative control at low ownership levels as a legally cognizable
threat to justify the adoption of a poison pill as a proportionate response under Unocal and finding that
shareholder disenfranchisement claims under Blasius will fail when any impact on electoral rights is
incidental to the board’s defensive action). However, David J. Berger of Wilson Sonsini Goodrich &
Rosati has argued that there is an essential difference between companies that adopt both a poison pill
and staggered board and companies that employ dual-class structures. Namely, the former type of
company can still succumb to short-termism in an effort to keep activist investors at bay during two
years of proxy fights. The latter type of company is free to pursue long-term objectives at the expense
of short-term financial performance without risk of shareholder retribution. See Lowell Milken
Institute for Business Law and Policy, Corporate Governance and Founder Control Panel, YOUTUBE (Mar.
9, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tu9LT2qQHZ4 [https://perma.cc/6FQR-U6VP] (“To be
clear, the appeal in a staggered board isn’t even close to what dual-class stock provides.”).
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B. Unimplemented Novel Approaches to Regulating Nonvoting Shares
Given recent decisions where Delaware has recognized the theory of
efficient capital markets in the appraisal rights context and principle of
shareholder ratification in the fiduciary duty context, it is especially
important that shareholder voting rights be fortified—and enlarged in the
case of nonvoting shares altogether.236 I advance a new multipronged
framework for regulating dual-class structures and nonvoting stock. Broadly
speaking, effective regulations ought to enlarge voting powers or enlarge
fiduciary protections in certain contexts. In order from least invasive to most
forceful, federal securities laws could enable nonvoting shares to cast
nonbinding votes; state corporate laws ought to legally mandate that
nonvoting shareholders have a right to attend annual meetings in an observer
capacity; state courts should impose a heightened standard of judicial review
for companies with dual-class structures to encourage the use of procedures
that empower shareholder votes; and nonvoting shares ought to have
additional voting rights in some specific contexts as a matter of positive law.
1. Enable Nonvoting Shares to Cast Nonbinding Votes
One means of regulating nonvoting shares is to allow for nonbinding
votes—recorded and disclosed just like any other votes. This device is similar
to the “say-on-pay” and “say-on-frequency” provisions of Dodd–Frank, which
are nonbinding.237 This would entitle nonvoting shareholders to cast a protest
vote and enable them to broadcast strong signals of dissent to controllers and
the marketplace in general.238 A nonbinding vote of nonvoting shareholders
may help to discipline controlling shareholders and directors, to reduce
agency costs and monitoring costs of directors by shareholders, and to assure
that the board remains responsive to shareholder interests.239
2. Enable Observer Rights and Information Access
Another form of regulation would be to legally permit nonvoting
shareholder participation in annual meetings in terms of observer rights and
236 See supra notes 71 and 78 and accompanying text.
237 See supra notes 192 and accompanying text.
238 See Ronald Orol, Activist Investors Target Snapchat Parent Snap over Non-Voting IPO Shares,
THESTREET (Feb. 8, 2017, 8:51 PM), https://www.thestreet.com/story/13993165/1/insurgents-rail-

against-snap-over-non-voting-ipo-shares.html [https://perma.cc/V7HY-D8L2] (“Activist hedge
funds can . . . target dual-class companies with unequal voting structures by nominating director
candidates in the hopes that a large vote of the noninsider shareholders will back their nominees,
sending an embarrassing message to the company that change is needed. However, companies with
nonvoting shares will be impervious . . . .”(emphasis added)).
239 See supra notes 28, 46–47 and accompanying text.
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minimum information rights. Shareholders ought to be able to evaluate a
company and its management team.
One rationale for allowing dual-class structures is that “nonvoting shares
can be used to allocate voting power to informed investors who value their
voting rights.”240 If one is to accept this argument, nonvoting shareholders
ought to have the ability to inform themselves, so they can choose among
voting shares, nonvoting shares, or no shares at all. Appropriate disclosure
underpins the duty of candor,241 securities fraud regulation,242 and recent
Delaware doctrinal developments revealed in MFW and Corwin.243
3. Impose a More Stringent Standard of Review for Dual-Class Companies
to Encourage “One Share, One Vote” Voting in Specific Contexts
Practitioners and academics have recently suggested that state courts
could modify their judicial standards of review for dual-class companies.244
As previously explored in Part I, fiduciary duties and voting power are two
primary mechanisms by which common stockholders are protected by state
corporate law, and there is a strong interplay between judicial standards of
review for fiduciary duty allegations and degree of shareholder protection.
Specifically, Professor Albert H. Choi argues that courts ought to apply a
heightened standard and determine whether it is more likely than not that a
controlling shareholder made decisions for private benefits rather than for the
benefit of the corporation as a whole.245 When applying such a heightened
scrutiny standard, Professor Choi asserts that “at least two factors should come
into play. First is whether the separation of control from cash flow rights is

Lund, supra note 136, at 5.
See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
See Exchange Act Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018) (“It shall be unlawful for any person
. . . [t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made . . . not misleading . . . in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.”).
243 See supra notes 71–75 and accompanying text.
244 See e.g., Albert H. Choi, Concentrated Ownership and Long-Term Shareholder Value, 8 HARV.
BUS. L. REV. 53, 74 (2018) (“[L]egal mechanisms, such as dual class, stock pyramids, and cross
ownership, should be subjected to heightened judicial scrutiny . . . .”); Haas & Brewer, supra note
22, at 4 (“[One] interesting question is whether conditioning an interested transaction on, among
other things, the approval of a majority of the outstanding nonvoting shares would cause a court to
invoke the business judgment rule.”); Moloney, Sullivan & Sachar, supra note 22, at 13 (“In the end,
however, Snap may have substituted one nuisance for another: frequent and protracted litigation
under potentially heightened judicial scrutiny.”).
245 See Choi, supra note 244, at 79 (“To the extent that decisions made or dictated by a
controlling shareholder have a higher probability of being for personal benefit rather than for the
corporation as a whole and that there is a strict separation between control rights and cash-flow
rights under dual class structure, one possibility is for the courts to apply a heightened standard . . .
in reviewing the transactions.”).
240
241
242
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extreme . . . . Second, an emphasis should be put on the long-term return for
the minority shareholders and for the firm as a whole.”246 While theoretically
thorough, implementing this type of heighted scrutiny is likely to be
problematic for a Delaware court. What does it mean for the wedge between
voting rights and cash flow rights to be “extreme”?247 This sort of standard
unsoundly introduces line-drawing problems, and a court of equity is unlikely
to adopt hard and fast rules to do justice. How will a court determine “whether
the firm has in fact produced value in the long run”?248 This invites a battle of
experts to make arguments around what the appropriate industry benchmarks
are and what the correct performance metrics are.249 Further, is “value” purely
financial in nature or is there scope to consider nonfinancial interests250 as well
as the impact on other constituents?251 Delaware courts are more equipped to
grapple with issues of process and procedure rather than disputes over
substance when creating new common law.252 A heightened standard of review
is nonetheless warranted in the dual-class company context.
Practitioner James Moloney of Gibson Dunn has focused on different
aspects of heightened judicial scrutiny and argued that
[w]hile the presence of non-voting shares does not itself preclude a review
under the business judgment standard, it seems one practical effect of Snap’s
voting structure is that it may deprive the Company of the basic mechanisms
and tools to implement procedural safeguards, such as subjecting a proposed

246 Id. at 79-80.
247 Id. at 79.
248 Id. at 80.
249 Cf. LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH:
SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE

HOW PUTTING
PUBLIC 68 (2012)
(“‘Heterogeneous expectations’ asset-pricing models (which differ from conventional financialpricing models by assuming, realistically, that people disagree about the future) also suggest a
number of ‘financial engineering’ tricks that short-term investors can push corporate managers to
adopt to raise share price without improving long-term performance.”).
250 See generally Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare
Not Market Value, 2 J.L. FIN. & ACCT. 247, 249, 270 (2017) (arguing that “shareholder welfare is not
equivalent to market value” and concluding that “[o]ne way to facilitate [welfare maximization] is
to let shareholders vote on the broad outlines of corporate policy”). Applying the Hart & Zingales
framework to companies with dual-class structures presents a dilemma: if welfare maximization is
achieved by allowing shareholders to vote on corporate policies, then companies that deviate from
“one share, one vote” cannot achieve welfare maximization.
251 Compare Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (allowing
directors in a hostile takeover battle to consider “the impact on ‘constituencies’ other than shareholders
(i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally)”), with Revlon, Inc.
v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176 (Del. 1986) (“[W]hile concern for various
corporate constituencies is proper when addressing a takeover threat, that principle is limited by the
requirement that there be some rationally related benefit accruing to the stockholders.”).
252 This assertion is consistent with the business judgement rule presumption, the burden shifting
mechanism of Kahn v. Lynch, and the standard of review shifting mechanism of both MFW and Corwin.
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transaction to a vote of the minority public shareholders (e.g., ‘majority-ofthe-minority’ approval). Such mechanisms would help shield some future
business decisions from heightened judicial scrutiny.253

On the contrary, however, I argue that nonvoting shareholders could
introduce procedural safeguards in an attempt to comply with MFW and
secure business judgement review in the context of controlling shareholder
transactions. As a strict matter, MFW—not Corwin—ought to apply to
corporations with dual-class structures.254 A blockholder with high-vote stock
that has majority voting rights and a less-than-majority cash flow rights will
always satisfy the definition of “controlling shareholder.”255 Recall, MFW
shifts the standard of review from entire fairness to business judgment when
a merger is conditioned upon the “approval of [both] an independent,
adequately-empowered Special Committee . . . and the uncoerced, informed
vote of a majority of the minority stockholders.”256 Thus, dual-class
companies must replicate both of these protective measures.
First, starting with the “majority-of-the-minority” provision, I argue that
the relevant shareholder vote would be based on a majority of all shares across
all classes of common stock, including nonvoting shares, adjusted for
economic rights and unweighted for voting power. In this manner, “one share,
one vote” would be implemented in specific conflicted or defective
transaction contexts faced by a dual-class company. As long as the controller
would not have control under a “one share, one vote” methodology, the
controller could participate in the vote on equal terms such that cash flow

Moloney, Sullivan & Sachar, supra note 22, at 12.
In determining whether Corwin or MFW applies, the threshold question is whether the
transaction involves a controlling shareholder. See generally, Steven M. Haas & Meghan Garrant, The
Importance of Alleging Control: Between Corwin and MFW, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE
& FIN. REG. (Apr. 19, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/04/19/the-importance-of-allegingcontrol-between-corwin-and-mfw/#more-106215 [https://perma.cc/J77G-LLGW] (“If [a party is]
deemed a controlling stockholder, then it would trigger heightened judicial scrutiny and require
certain additional deal procedures to qualify for business judgment rule protection.”).
255 A “controlling stockholder” is one who either controls a majority of a corporation’s voting
power or wields “a combination of potent voting power and management control such that the
stockholder could be deemed to have effective control of the board without actually owning a
majority of stock.” Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 307 (Del. 2015). For a minority
blockholder, the inquiry is highly fact intensive, and one must not conflate mere influence with
control. The percentage ownership for a less-than-majority shareholder is not dispositive. Compare
In re Rouse Properties, Inc., C.A. No. 12194-VCS, 2018 WL 1226015, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 9, 2018)
(finding a 33.5% blockholder to not be a controller) with In re Tesla Motors, Inc. Stockholder
Litig., C.A. No. 12711-VCS, 2018 WL 1560293, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 28, 2018) (finding a 22.1%
shareholder to be a controller). A court will also consider whether a minority blockholder could
exercise veto rights and secure negative control when bylaws provide for supermajority voting
requirements. Id. at *15.
256 Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014).
253
254
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rights would align with voting entitlements for the purposes of such a vote.257
If the controller would still retain control under a “one share, one vote”
methodology, the rule would revert to a majority-of-minority or majority-ofunaffiliated regime. Furthermore, the voters would have to be uncoerced and
informed so there would be need for adequate disclosure. In the case of
nonvoting stock, such disclosure would have to be consistent with proxy
statement admissions rather than minimal Form 8-K filings, even if it went
beyond the information to which stockholders would otherwise be entitled.258
Second, moving on to the “adequately empowered Special Committee,” I
argue that director independence could be achieved if the low-vote or
nonvoting shareholders were empowered to elect a certain proportion of
directors.259 This would encourage dual-class companies to empower such
shareholders to have directorial representation on the board, and these
directors would form the basis for the Special Committee.
I believe these two implementations could successfully reproduce the
protective devices evinced by MFW. Although the business judgment rule
review may seem to harm shareholders, it would benefit them on the whole
since they would become empowered to make their own decisions in all sorts
of conflicted transactions. This judicially imposed form of regulation would
encourage—but not necessarily require—shareholder voting empowerment.
4. Expressly Mandate “One Share, One Vote” Voting in Specific Contexts
Next, I argue that “nonvoting shares” ought to have additional voting
rights in some specific contexts mandated by positive law rather than
stipulated by a corporation’s articles of incorporation. Specifically, “nonvoting
shares” ought to have additional voting rights in fundamental transactions
where the fear is heightened that a controller lacks appropriate incentives
given the wedge between his voting rights and his cash flow rights. Under
Delaware corporate law, nonvoting shareholders are not entitled to vote in the
event of dissolution, mergers, consolidations, or substantial sales of assets.260
Using a contractarian argument, shareholders of dual-class companies agreed
to low-vote or nonvoting stock on the premise that the controlling founders
have the unique skills to manage the enterprise and that the multiclass
structure protects shareholders when there is a risk of influence from outside
investors.261 However, upon a proposed sale of control to a third-party acquirer
This is contrary to majority-of-minority or majority-of-unaffiliated voting schemes.
See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 205–214 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text.
When Google settled its shareholder litigation concerning its stock recapitalization plan,
Chancellor Strine, in approving the settlement, adopted a contractarian view and said, “[T]he
257
258
259
260
261
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these presumptions are no longer valid. Once a company is for sale, this should
not only trigger Revlon duties for directors but should also trigger voting rights
for nonvoting shareholders. In other words, “the object no longer is to protect
or maintain the corporate enterprise but to sell it to the highest bidder.”262
CONCLUSION
The voting rights of common stockholders have been gerrymandered
through the use of dual-class stock structures which reshuffle voting
entitlements and drive a wedge between voting rights and cash flow rights.
The extreme case of nonvoting common stock amounts to disenfranchisement
of public shareholders and necessitates modest reform. Current forms of
regulation inadequately address the problems posed by nonvoting stock. I
have advanced a novel multipronged framework for regulating nonvoting
stock. First, federal securities laws could enable nonvoting shares to cast
nonbinding votes. Second, state corporate laws would legally mandate that
nonvoting shareholders have the right to attend annual meetings in an
observer role. Third, state courts could impose a heightened standard of
judicial review compliant with MFW for companies with dual-class structures
to encourage the use of procedures that empower shareholder votes. Fourth,
nonvoting shares would have additional voting rights in some specific
contexts as a matter of positive law.
As SEC Chairman Jay Clayton recently conceded in public remarks,
The engine of economic growth in this country depends significantly on the
willingness of Main Street investors to put their hard-earned capital at risk in
our markets over the long term. If our system of corporate governance is not
ensuring that the views and fundamental interests of these long-term retail
investors are being protected, then we have a lot of work to do to make it so.263

founders’ continued control of Google seemed to be something of an understanding among . . . the
firm’s investors.” Matt Chiappardi, Google Stock Split Settlement OK’d, but Fees Cut To $9M, LAW360
(Oct. 28, 2013, 6:29 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/483819/google-stock-split-settlementok-d-but-fees-cut-to-9m [https://perma.cc/QWU3-M5KT].
262 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).
263 Jay Clayton, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Opening Remarks to SEC–NYU Dialogue
on Securities Markets #4: Shareholder Engagement (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/clayton-2018-01-19 [https://perma.cc/Q49P-RTYV].
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I expect nonvoting shares to be a renewed area of focus for founders and
boards of directors,264 plaintiff’s attorneys and state law jurists,265 U.S.
Congress and federal securities regulators,266 and stock exchanges and
marketmakers in the decades to come.

264 See e.g., Nick Wingfield & Jack Nicas, Tech Founders Embraced Control Over Companies: This One
Is Giving It Up, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/02/technology/zyngashares.html (explaining that the founder of Zynga intends to unify his superior voting stock “partly
because of growing criticism of dual- and multiclass share structures”).
265 See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 957 (Del. 1985) (“[O]ur corporate law is
not static. It must grow and develop in response to, indeed in anticipation of, evolving concepts and needs.”).
266 Chairman Clayton recently indicated, however, that he was not putting dual-class
structures at the forefront of the SEC’s agenda and further noted that he is “not persuaded by
absolutists on either end” of the debate. Meaghan Kilroy, CII Conference Panelists Dish on Corporate
Culture, Voting Structures, PENSIONS & INV. (Mar. 16, 2018, 11:47 AM), http://www.pionline.com/
article/20180316/ONLINE/180319890/cii-conference-panelists-dish-on-corporate-culture-votingstructures [https://perma.cc/4CEB-QDH5].
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APPENDIX
Table 1: High-Vote, Low-Stock with 10-to-1 Voting Ratio

Share Class
Class B:
High-Vote Stock
Class A:
Low-Vote Stock
Total

Number of
Shares

Percent of
Cash Flow
Rights

Number of
Votes per
Share

Total
Number of
Votes

Percent of
Voting
Rights

90,910

9.0910%

10

909,100

50.0003%

909,090

90.9090%

1

909,090

49.9997%

1,000,000

100.0%

1,818,190

100.0%

Table 2: High-Vote, Low-Stock with 10-to-1 Voting Ratio
and an Ownership-Percentage Sunset Threshold at 9%

Share Class
Without Trigger
Class B:
High-Vote Stock
Class A:
Low-Vote Stock
Total
With Trigger
Class B:
High-Vote Stock
Class A:
Low-Vote Stock
Total

Number of
Shares

Percent of
Cash Flow
Rights

Number of
Votes per
Share

Total
Number of
Votes

Percent of
Voting
Rights

89,999

8.9999%

10

899,990

49.7235%

910,001

91.0001%

1

910,001

50.2765%

1,000,000

100.0%

1,809,991

100.0%

89,999

8.9999%

1

89,999

8.9999%

910,001

91.0001%

1

910,001

91.0001%

1,000,000

100.0%

1,000,000

100.0%

*

*

*

*

*

